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ABSTRACT
This paper explores the relationship between culture and political behavior
through an investigation of those Japanese Americans who were denied due
process and imprisoned during World War Two simply for being of Japanese
descent. Military necessity was the reason cited for the government's action,
although racism, war hysteria and economic competition also played a major
role.
At the time there was a general belief among Caucasian Americans that
the Japanese in America had avoided Americanization and could not be trusted
to participate in democratic processes. It was suggested that their political and
civic culture was an obstacle to the achievement of democratic aspirations.
Using an approach similar to that pioneered by Almond and Verba in their
1963 study of five nations, this research explores the political and civic culture of
the Japanese American Evacuees and argues that the skills required for
meaningful participation in political and civic networks were present in the
Japanese Americans, but went unrecognized.
The study concludes by finding no substantiation of the claim that the
Japanese in America were then, or are now either un-Americanized or politically
incompetent in a democracy.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Because the American notion of democracy makes possible, preserves
and promotes a variety of desires, all kinds of people have come to admire it and
consider it a good way of life. A great number migrate to the United States from
different nations, and residents and immigrants meet, mix, and intermarry. The
result is the greatest possible variation in character, upbringing and styles of life.
But, democracy is not an unqualified good. In an illiberal democracy, there
is the possibility of tyranny of the majority, of the many over the few. The melting
pot does not treat everyone equally. Contradictions between ideology and reality
sometimes surface in our history. Leighton (1945, p. 345) refers to Americans as
"authoritarian democrats" who create an impossible situation for those we govern
by teaching them to be like us and thereby achieve what we have achieved, but
at the same time build barriers intended to make any such achievement
impossible.
Sometimes conflict between a majority and minority group is "solved" by
population transfer. This occurred in the case of both the Native American tribes
and, in 1942, Japanese Americans living on the West Coast of the United States.
The political and civic behaviors of those 120,000 Japanese Americans interned
in American concentration camps are the focus of this research.
The Problem
At the beginning of World War Two, Japanese Americans who
sought to demonstrate their Americanism by participating in war related

community affairs were turned away (Spicer, 1969). Japanese in the
United States had found that they, like the Chinese before them, were
accused of being unable to adopt an American way of life (Hayashi, 1983).
Among several rationales used to justify the evacuation and internment
was an underlying belief that the Japanese in America, even though two
thirds of them were U.S. citizens by birth, had somehow avoided
Americanization. They were under the influence of an alien culture, and
did not possess values, skills, or an underlying belief system consistent
with American philosophy and, therefore, could not be trusted in a
democracy.
Grodzins (1949) reports that the claim that cultural factors inhibiting
Americanization of Japanese in America was the least frequently used argument,
though it was specifically used by the California State Personnel Board when
they released all persons of Japanese descent from state employment. The
belief that culturally based antidemocratic tradition is an obstacle to political
participation continues to be an issue for discussion even today (Kitano, 1969,
Lien, 1997). According to Chung (1992) many ethnic Asians do not participate in
politics or civic activities because their parents taught them to shun expression of
public opinions.
Generally speaking, what these reservations imply is not only that
Japanese and Japanese Americans did not possess the proper political
knowledge, but also and more importantly, neither did they possess the political
judgement to be actively involved in the deliberation of complex policy issues.

The debate arose, of course, because of the real or alleged differences as to the
actual and potential capacity of Japanese Americans for a full and responsible
civic life. This, in turn, involves varying views about leadership, the relationship
between the people and their political leaders, the real meaning of equality, and
methods of assuring political discourse while preserving social stability.
Purpose of the Study
Although the forced evacuation and internment of 120,000 persons for
close to four years is an extraordinary and well documented event, it is most
often treated merely as history or a case study in civil rights. This paper treats the
evacuation in a different manner from the standard methods of cataloguing
events, or highlighting racial victimization and intends to explore civic
orientations, and democratic performance of the Evacuees themselves.
This study hypothesizes that the contemporary view of Japanese
Americans as unassimilated and incompatible with American political and civic
culture was incorrect. Evacuees displayed their civic and political competence,
during and after internment in the relocation centers. Using evidence obtained
from both literature and personal interviews, the research will confirm that their
competence was dynamic and public spirited, demonstrating a level of
participation in voluntary associations and partisan politics comparable to other
Americans.
Significance of the Research
While Almond and Verba (1963) investigated the political culture of
five countries, more recently, Verba, Nie and Kim (1978) examined seven.

Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995) made an extensive study of political
culture throughout the United States. Other research has been done on
minority political participation (Verba & Nie, 1972; De la Garza, et al.,
1992; Dawson, 1994), Asian American participation (Lien, 1997) and even
Japanese American participation (Fugita & O'Brien, 1991). Data related to
political and civic behaviors of the evacuees themselves seems to be
absent.
The events of the Japanese American Evacuation also provide an
excellent case study in political - social studies, and lessons learned could
be applied to studies in political efficacy in general.
Terminology
The lexicon of the Japanese American evacuation and internment
is often confusing. For example, various government entities and
personnel referred to the Japanese and Japanese Americans in the
camps as evacuees, colonists, residents, or non-appointed personnel. The
camps were officially called relocation centers, but also referred to as
colonies, and often communities. The word "interned" is frequently used,
but technically appropriate only for those who were Japanese citizens, not
for the two thirds who were US citizens. Strictly speaking, an "evacuee" is
a person who is evacuated; the word does not imply incarceration.
Caucasian personnel who worked in the camps were referred to
variously as staff, administrators, or appointed personnel. The senior
administrator of each camp was called the project director.

The words "concentration camp" are technically appropriate, since
they refer to a temporary location where civilians who may give aid and
comfort to an enemy are detained. President Roosevelt, himself, referred
to the relocation centers as concentration camps, however, later discovery
of the Nazi camps in Europe imparted a new definition to the words,
making them synonymous with "death camp" (Kitano, 1969, p. 61-62).
Broom & Kitsuse (1956) see this confusion as evidence of a government
cover-up (21). The Commission on Wartime Relocation of Civilians simply
calls the words "euphemisms" (CWRIC, 1982, p.VII).
In this paper the word "evacuee" refers to those resident Japanese
citizens and Japanese Americans who were removed from their homes by
executive and military orders, transported by the government to one of ten camps
and confined. There were generally three categories represented: the Issei who
were born in Japan and were Japanese citizens, the Nisei, who were born in the
United States and were US citizens, and the Kibei, who were Nisei who had lived
in Japan and received a Japanese education. Redress refers to compensation
from the United States government for losses sustained during the forced
evacuation.
The former evacuees who were interviewed for this research tended to
use the phrase "in camp", when referring to the relocation centers, such as "were
you in camp?", or "when I was in camp." In this paper the official government
term "relocation center" is used to identify any of the ten camps described in
Appendix A.

Such discussion is necessary, but somewhat esoteric. During one
interview with a former Nisei evacuee I asked, "What word did you use to
describe yourself? Were you an "internee" or an "evacuee?" She responded
emphatically, "I was a prisoner!"

Chapter 2
Literature Review
Many works on the evacuation and relocation are available to the
researcher. Some were written by Caucasian researchers and others by
former Japanese American evacuees. Some of the earliest came from
studies made by sociologists and cultural anthropologists assigned to
each camp as social analysts (Leighton, 1945). The U. S. Government
War Relocation Authority (WRA) kept good records and many are
available. (WRA, 1947; Sugihara, 1943; Daniels, 1989). A number of
magazine articles were written for popular publication during the event.
Several appeared in magazines with a religious orientation, such as
Christian Century. Various thesis and dissertations related to this subject
are on record (Hopkinson, 1951; Jackman, 1955). Much of the
remainder consists of accounts of evacuation events (Nelson, 1976;
Oda, 1980). A final category consists of personal anecdotes including
diaries, art or poetry related to the evacuation and internment (Gorfinkel,
1995; Eaton, 1952).
Krammer (1997) reported finding over one thousand published
works on the subject in the Library of Congress. The bibliography to this
paper (Appendix B) lists over 100 selected references related to
Japanese American immigration, culture, evacuation, and internment
available for background study or further research.

Rationale for Evacuation
In February 1942, Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Executive Order
9066 which provided a legal basis for eventually placing 120,000 men,
women and children of Japanese descent in American concentration
camps (Hatamiya, 1993). At the time it was alleged to be of military
necessity, however, modern historians dispute this opinion. A 1982
assessment provided by the Presidential Commission on the Wartime
Internment and Relocation of Civilians (CWIRC) stated:
Military necessity, and the decisions that followed from it - detention,
ending detention and ending exclusion - were not driven by analysis of
military conditions did not justify the promulgation of Executive Order
9066. The broad historical causes that shaped these decisions were
race prejudice, hysteria and a failure of political leadership. Widespread
ignorance of Japanese Americans contributed to a policy conceived in
haste and executed in an atmosphere of fear and anger at Japan. A
grave injustice was done to American citizens and resident aliens of
Japanese ancestry who, without individual review or any probative
evidence against them, were excluded, removed and detained by the
United States during World War II (p. 18).
Grodzins (1949) analyzed hundreds of pro-evacuation statements
and uncovered eleven specific arguments used for the evacuation.
1. Sabotage, espionage, fifth column: The Japanese were actual or potential
saboteurs, fifth -columnists, or espionage agents.

2. Public morale: Widespread distrust of the Japanese population lowered public
morale on the West Coast; correspondingly, evacuation would lift public
morale.
3. Humanitarianism: The Japanese (a) were themselves in danger from actual
or potential vigilantes, and the evacuation (b) would be carried out with
decency and without hardship.
4. Approval of Japanese militarism: The Japanese in America had earlier
favored Japanese aggression in Asia; had been informed of Pearl Harbor in
advance but had not revealed the secret; and in no single instance gave
adverse information about dangerous members of their own race to the
intelligence agencies.
5. Influence of Japanese government: The Japanese military government
exerted great influence over Japanese in America, and even American
citizens of Japanese ancestry were citizens of Japan.
6. Migration and distribution: The Japanese had invaded America by fraudulent
immigration, and they had located themselves in strategic areas.
7.

Race: Because of racial peculiarities, Japanese Americans were unassimilable, their thought-processes were inscrutable, and the loyal could not
be distinguished from the disloyal. Their high birth rate was a mark of special
danger.

8. Culture: Cultural practices (language schools, vernacular press, sending
children to Japan for education) enhanced the racial barrier to assimilation.

9. Economics: Economic practices made Japanese undesirable competitors,
and their productive contribution to the nation's economy was negligible. In any
case, evacuees could be employed in productive work at points of concentration.
10. Appeal to patriotism: Loyalty of the Japanese wold be demonstrated by
acceptance of evacuation; if they refused to co-operate, they thereby showed
disloyalty.
11. Necessity for drastic measures: Constitutional rights had to give way, in
total war, to drastic measures (p. 400-401).
Argument number eight, "Cultural practices (language schools, vernacular
press, sending children to Japan for education) enhanced the racial barrier to
assimilation" indicates that there was widespread ignorance of the culture of
the Japanese in America leading to a belief that they were unassimilated, and
under the influence of a belligerent foreign culture.
A 1942 Army analysis concluded with the statement that "The
Japanese race is an enemy race and while many second and third
generation Japanese born in the United States soil, possessed of United
States Citizenship, have become 'Americanized,' the racial strains are
undiluted." The memorandum goes on to say, "It therefore follows that
along the vital Pacific Coast over 112,000 potential enemies of Japanese
extraction, are at large today" (Smith, 1995, p. 124). In the United States
Senate, Tom Stewart of Tennessee declared that the Japanese were
"cowardly and immoral. They are different from Americans in every
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conceivable way, and no Japanese should ever have the right to claim
American citizenship" (Smith, 1995, p. 120).
General DeWitt, Commander of the newly formed Western Defense
Command and architect of the Japanese American Evacuation, described them
as a "large, unassimilated, tightly-knit racial group bound to an enemy nation by
strong ties of race, culture, custom, and religion " (Arrington, 1962, p. 5). A
delegate from the California Joint Immigration Committee, speaking before the
Tolan Committee said "Many American citizens of Japanese ancestry were sent
to Japan for an education which "for all intents and purposes" made them
Japanese. Language schools in America tended to accomplish the same
purpose. The religion of emperor worship similarly led people away from
Americanism " (Grodzins, 1949, p. 408).
The Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians
(CWRIC, 1982) reported that four cultural patterns: dual citizenship, language
schools, and education in Japan, foreign religion, and ethnic organizations which
were seen as evidence that the Japanese in America "would not or could not
assimilate to American life and represented an alien threat" (p. 41). That same
commission also revealed that "The government's efforts to Americanize the
children in the camps were often bitterly ironic:
An oft-repeated ritual in relocation camp schools ... was the salute to the
flag followed by the singing of "My Country, 'tis of thee, sweet land of
liberty" - a ceremony Caucasian teachers found embarrassingly awkward
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if not cruelly poignant in the austere prison - camp setting" (CWRIC, 1982,
p. 11).
Supporters of the Japanese Americans were few. Los Angeles
Baptist minister C.C. Pierce presented one opposing view when he
testified before a House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization
that, "There is no Japanese problem in California. ... It is not true at all
that they ... hold a divided allegiance, that they do not understand or
appreciate our institutions ... that they are an unassimilable race" (Foner &
Rosenberg, 1963, p. 63). Such voices were rare. Even the American Civil
Liberties Union refused to defend them (McDaid, 1969).
Many liberal Caucasian Americans held no particular animosity for
the Japanese in America. But, even for these people, the evacuation was
seen as a way of making some good come out of a bad situation. The
camps where the evacuees were interned were intended to be not only
places of confinement, but also "Americanization units" (Gridner and
Loftis, 1969, p. 310), places where the evacuees could be exposed to
American ideas and practice American style democracy on a small scale,
and be better prepared to assume full citizenship responsibilities after the
war. This was not a new idea. Planned Americanization efforts had been
conducted by the US government in the Philippines (Stanley, 1974;
Pomeroy, 1974), and on Native American Reservations (Harmon, 1949;
Kelly, 1983) prior to World War Two, and would later be devised for
Vietnamese and other ethnic South-East Asians (Savale, 1979; Henkin &
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Nguyen, 1981).
The War Relocation Authority, which ran most of the camps, continued
this theme of un - assimilation when it declared that one purpose for internment
was to teach citizenship (WRA, 1947). When describing the required
organizational structure for a typical camp "community" they wrote: "A community
government shall have as its objectives the training of residents of the community
in the democratic principles of civic participation and responsibility...." (Broom
and Kitsuse, 1956, p. 21). Evacuees in the relocation centers were urged to
create a "democratic model community" (Yatsushiro, 1953, p. 490).
Referring to the Issei, who had been born in Japan, Dr. T. G. Ishimaru, a
former chairman of the Poston Relocation Center Community Council wrote:
Let us make the Issei government conscious, that there is a responsibility
on their shoulders to make them better citizens, to make them understand
American Institutions, which are theirs as long as they live in this country.
In one respect, this is an Americanization program (1943, p.8).
Appendix C provides a list of events related to the evacuation and
internment. Appendix D describes the evacuation program from the
government's point of view.
Relevant Research Theory
Although participation in government is an integral part of both the ideal
and the practice of democracy, such participation is sometimes difficult to define.
There is, of course, voter and political party participation, but there is also
committee membership, and organized private associations. Verba, Nie and Kim
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(1978) consider only "legal acts" such as voting, campaign activities,
particularized contacts, and communal activities. However, Verba, Scholozman
and Brady (1995) expand the definition to include additional means such as
protests, demonstrations, strikes and riots.
Armed with extensive survey data, Almond and Verba (1963) investigated
the relationship between culture and viable democracy and determined that
effective democracy depends on citizen competence, trust, and cooperation.
They argue that:
If in most social situations the individual finds himself subservient to some
authority figure, it is likely that he will expect such an authority relationship
in the political sphere. On the other hand, if outside the political sphere he
has the opportunity to participate in a wide range of social decisions, he
will probably expect to be able to participate in political decisions as well.
Furthermore, participation in nonpolitical decision making may give one
skills needed to engage in political participation (pp. 271-272).
In effect, those persons who do not learn how to participate in decisions at
home, school, or in the workplace may not develop the motivation and skills of
participation, and subsequently become excluded from public participation in
government and the civic arena. In this approach, political culture consists of
normative values, attitudes and beliefs within the specified population.
Putnam (1993), reached much the same conclusion in his investigation of
the culture and government of Italy. Exploring the link between civic attitudes of
different regions of Italy and efficiency of government, he found that the cultural
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legacy of the regions had a notable effect on the responsiveness of
governments.
Blau (1974,1977) argued that society is structured so as to cluster
individuals in groups based on nominal parameters such as race, sex, religion
and residence. Others (Sherif & Sherif, 1953; Tajfel, 1982) propose that those
groups may be altered by human interaction to form new groups based on
wealth, education and power. Rogers & Kincaid (1981) and Wellman (1988)
demonstrated that while social ties are strongest among persons with similar
backgrounds, they commonly cross boundaries and build bridges between
groups. Although primary socialization is a powerful force, human behavior is
also influenced by human interaction. This suggests that while our similarities
bind us within groups, our social, and possibly our political culture is defined by
linkages between groups.
Inside the Relocation Centers
The War Relocation Authority had the responsibility for providing all
support necessary to sustain the evacuees. This was accomplished under
difficult conditions, with wartime shortages. Ten permanent camps to house the
evacuees were built in remote areas in the Western United States. Figure 1 lists
each relocation center. More detailed information is available in Appendix A.
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Figure 1. War Relocation Centers

NAME

LOCATION

OPENING DATE

CLOSING DATE

Manzanar

Manzanar, Inyo
County, California
Poston, Yuma
County, Arizona
Newell, Modoc
County, California
Rivers, Final
County, Arizona
Hunt, Jerome
County, Idaho
Heart Mountain,
Park county,
Wyoming
Amache, Prowers
County, Colorado
Topaz, Millard
County, Utah
McGehee, Desha
County, Arkansas
Denson, Drew and
Chicot Counties,
Arkansas

March 21, 1942

November 21,
1945
November 28,
1945
March 20, 1946

Colorado Rover
Tule Lake
Gila River
Minidoka
Heart Mountain
Granada
Central Utah
Rohwer
Jerome

May8, 1942

May 27, 1942
July 20, 1942
August 10, 1942

November 10,
1945
October 28, 1945

PEAK
POPULATION
10,046
17,814
18,789
13,348
9,397

August 12, 1942

November 10,
1945

10,767

August 27, 1942

October 15, 1945

7,318

September 11,
1942
September 18,
1942
October 6, 1942

October 31, 1945

8,130

November 30,
1945
June 30, 1944

8,475
8,497

Arrington (1962, p. 10) from US Department of Interior, from WRA: A Story
of Human Conservation, Washington D.C., 1946.

While the physical standards and comfort level of the relocation
centers were generally low, these camps should not be confused with the
death camps run by Nazis in Germany. The Japanese American
relocation centers were concentration camps used to gather up and
confine civilians who may engage in acts of war against the interning
power and, as Kitano (1969) notes there was a systematic "process of
checking, clearing, and then releasing Japanese to areas of the United
States away from the prescribed Western Defense Area." This included
students going to college and adults looking for work (p. 35).
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The relocation centers were controlled by the War Relocation Authority
Staff in Washington DC. One relocation center, Poston, on the Colorado River
Indian Reservation, was originally placed under the Office of Indian Affairs and
was transferred to the War Relocation Authority on December 31, 1943.
(Leighton, 1945).
The Director of the War Relocation Authority was appointed by the
President and maintained an office and a staff in Washington D.C. The senior
administrator for each camp was called the Project Director. Each Project
Director was responsible directly to the Director of the War Relocation Authority.
The War Relocation Authority assumed responsibility for management of
the relocation Centers and maintenance of the evacuees after their delivery to
the relocation Centers by the Army. Initially, 110,000 persons were transferred
from Army control to be interned by the new civilian agency (Arrington, 1962), but
eventually 120,000 people would be incarcerated in the camps (Weglyn, 1976).
In spite of the obvious contradictions, War Relocation Authority
administrators envisioned an orderly, controlled and democratic "ideal
community" (Spicer, 1969, p.11). The War Relocation Authority office in
Washington published and distributed a "Community Government Handbook"
defining components of community government and their relationship to the
administration (WRA, 1947).
Laws of the United States, the individual state of internment, and local
regulations were enforced using both an internal security staff consisting of
evacuees and an external security staff provided by the Army who did not
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hesitate to use their weapons (Bosworth, 1967, Taylor, 1993). Boundaries of the
camps were marked by barbed wire and guard towers. The FBI was used on
occasion to investigate crimes and alleged subversive activity inside the
relocation centers (Jackman, 1955).
Despite formal organizational designs imposed by the War Relocation
Authority, over time several barracks grouped together into a block became the
fundamental unit of government for evacuees. Block residents exercised varying
degrees of influence over their own lives through the use of informal or formally
elected councils. In some relocation centers, each barracks had its own council.
Informal councils often were formed to meet a specific need, such as make a
decision to plan for land usage. Nissei, who were U.S. citizens, usually staffed
the formal councils, while the Issei generally dominated the informal councils.
Women rarely participated as members. (Spicer, 1969).
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Chapter 3

Research Methodology
Before an analysis of civic and political attributes of Japanese Americans
can be accomplished, it is necessary to specifically describe democratic attitudes
and behaviors and operationalize them for testing. The research plan identified
two major tasks. Essential to the first task was a historical reconstruction of
events related to Japanese American activities inside the relocation centers,
while the second task required fieldwork in the contemporary Japanese American
community.
Research Strategy 1: Political Participation Inside The Relocation Centers
Democracy is often associated with voting. But, political participation in a
democracy refers to any activity by private persons "that are more or less directly
aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel and/or the
decisions they make" (Verba, Nie, Kim, 1978). Verba, Schlozman and Brady
(1995, p.48) point out that in a democracy there are a wide variety of activities
intended to influence public policy. They break political participation into nine
sub-categories as shown in Figure 2.
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Figure 2. Kinds of Political Participation Found in American Democracy

Activity

Capacity for
Conveying Variation
Information In Volume Requirements

Vote

Low

Low

Time

Campaign
Work

Mixed

High

Time
Skills

Campaign
Contribution

Mixed

Highest

Money

Contact
An Official
Protest

High

Medium

Time
Skills

High

Medium

Time

Informal
Community
Work
Member of
Local Board
Affiliation with a
Political
Organization
Contribution to a
Political Cause

High

High

Time
Skills

High

High

Mixed

High

Time
Skills
Time, Skills
Money

Mixed

Highest

Money

This figure identifies several ways by which people can communicate their
needs and preferences to government authorities and induce those authorities to
be responsive. However, such methods require resources, some more than
others. The kinds of activities listed in the left hand column were used in this
research to identify and categorize evacuee political and civic behavior in the
relocation centers.
Research Strategy 2: Comparative Survey
The second part of the research involves a survey approach. The
research tool is the sample survey. The unit of observation is the individual and
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conclusions are based on aggregate data. While this study fits within the tradition
of the Civic Culture in that it uses a survey study to deal with a political issue, one
important deviation from the objectives of the Civic Culture is that in this study
there is no attempt to associate any particular political behaviors with the stability
of a larger political system. Rather, it simply tries to discover and identify among
a selected population those political behaviors generally associated with the
democratic political system as practiced in the United States. Inherent in this
view is the belief that political efficacy is associated with a general sense of being
personally effective and confident in dealing with authority, and that this same
sense of personal effectiveness and confidence is a learned behavior.
The focus is on three dimensions of political culture: Political socialization,
the obligation to participate, and voluntary organizational membership.
Research Limitations.
(a) Over fifty years has passed since the respondents lived in the relocation
centers.
(b) Small population; only 10 persons were interviewed.
(c) Non-random population; all contacts were achieved through personal
introduction. The persons who were interviewed had personal experiences in
only four of the ten relocation centers.
(d) The interviewees were all Nisei or Kibei. No Issei were available.
(e) Most data related to the categorical activities in Figure 1 were obtained
through a review of existing literature and are subject to the bias of the
original authors.
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(f) Most of the living former evacuees were relatively young dung this time in
history and their span of personal experience was limited.
Shortcomings of the method are.
(a) The writer assumes for this paper that generalizations made from the sample
are valid.
(b) There is also an assumption that interest and activity in political affairs
produces stable (good) government.
(c) There is an assumption that a certain political culture is supportive of stable
democracy and necessary to sustain it.
(g) This study focuses upon structures and processes of political activity. It
makes no attempt to measure either volume of activity or output effect on the
political processes.
(h) Conclusions reached using this methodology are highly interpretive and
tentative.
Data Collection Techniques
Since the events related to evacuation and internment took place over fifty
years ago, there are only two practical methods for gathering data on the subject.
One method is to do literature and archival research and the other is to interview
living former evacuees.
Research Strategy 1.
Literature and archival research involved a review of both primary and
secondary sources of data. Most data came from a variety of books related to the
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evacuation and internment, but some were also uncovered in original document
collections held at the Arizona Historical Society at Tempe.
When an event or behavior was discovered that fit within the operational
limits of democratic behavior as defined in Figure 2 on page 17, it was assigned
to that category. Some events fit into more than one category, but were only
used once in this research. Those events described in the Findings section of
this paper represent a sample of the events collected. For some events an
extensive narrative was required to place the event in context.
Each categorical event then becomes an argument that either the
Japanese in America were successfully "Americanized" by the relocation center
experience, or that their prior culture was fundamentally similar enough to the
larger American political culture that their behaviors were already compatible.
Research Strategy 2.
The process of data collection was primarily accomplished through
administration of a verbal questionnaire with some ancillary interviewing.
The subjects selected for inclusion in this study were not chosen on a
random basis. All participants were obtained through the personal assistance of
members of the Las Vegas Japanese American Citizen's League and are
members of that organization. Each interview was conducted in the respondent's
residence. The beginning of each interview consisted of an introduction and
explanation of the purpose of the interview. Only one interviewer was used and
each question was read verbatim from the written survey. When a respondent
asked for clarification on a question, that question was read again verbatim. The
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interviewer recorded all responses on an answer sheet. Respondents were
cooperative and each interview lasted not more than 45 minutes. The process of
verbally administering the questionnaire not only guaranteed a one hundred
percent completion rate, but also provided the researcher with an opportunity to
become familiar, through personal interaction, with the subjects. A list of
respondents is provided in Appendix E.
Sample size was 10. Total number in the Las Vegas area was
unavailable. Estimates from former evacuees ranged from 10 to 2,800.
Nine interviewees live in the Las Vegas area; one interviewee lives in
California and was visiting the Las Vegas area.
The assistance the directors of the Las Vegas Chapter of the
Japanese American Citizens League was requested to help locate former
evacuees. They refused to directly contact former evacuees, citing privacy
concerns and "respect for our elders." At their suggestion, an
advertisement was placed in the local JACL newsletter explaining the
research project and asking for former evacuees to call a listed phone
number to be included in the interview process. There were no responses
and no interviews were obtained by this method.
Several interviews were eventually obtained through personal
introductions initiated by Lillian Morizano, a former evacuee who is
publicly known and politically active. Even this method proved uncertain.
Two former evacuees refused to be interviewed, saying "We've been
interviewed so much. Can't you find some one else?" Two other initial
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refusals were later persuaded by Lillian to participate.
Most likely, the reluctance came from a dislike of dredging up old
memories, and concerns about possible invasive questions. After one
interview, the former evacuee made a comment about how easy the
interview had been and expressed surprise that I had not asked any
"intimate questions." She then picked up the phone and arranged
interviews with four of her friends.
The questionnaire was developed by adopting selected questions from the
original 1963 Almond and Verba survey. The final result contained 23
dichotomous and multiple response questions. Responses from the
questionnaire are compared to data from the general United States population.
The two sources are then examined, and similarities and differences noted. The
original question format used in the interviews is reproduced in Appendix F.
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Chapter 4
Findings
Research Strategy 1: Archival Data
Despite the inherently undemocratic environment of a concentration camp,
evidence of Verba, Schlozman and Brady's democratic methods of political
participation listed in figure 1, page 17 can be found among residents of the
relocation centers. All methods of political participation considered are voluntary.
None was obligatory or received compensation. Volume, frequency or outcomes
of these activities were not considerations, only that they were intended to
communicate information to public officials and influence public decision-making.
Some activities listed, such as those associated with informal community
work, may seem out of place as political acts. While some may have occurred
simply for social satisfaction, others were created in response to needs that were
unfulfilled by formal political structures.
Campaigns and Elections.
Campaigns and elections are considered of primary importance. Voting
has long been considered the single greatest determinant of citizen participation.
In line with their policy of providing training for evacuees in the American way of
life, the privilege to vote for candidates for community councils was extended to
all US citizens 18 years and older, while office holding was restricted to US
citizens at least 21 years of age. Issei could only hold appointive positions until
1943, when the policy was changed (Arrington, 1962). Elections, which often
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seemed contrived and purposeless, were difficult to manage in the authoritarian
atmosphere of a relocation center.
At Manzanar there was continuing controversy over the nature of selfgovernment. At one point the Project Director allowed for popular election of a
committee to create the camp charter. Some groups were opposed to self-rule,
wanting to keep the administration appointed Block Manager system. Jackman
(1955) reports that in some blocks no one voted at all and in most others those
elected were opposed to self-government. This represented no non-democratic
ideals, but simply a resignation to the power of the administration, which held
veto over the evacuees' will.
In January 1945 the Poston Council voted to accept an invitation to send
delegates to an All Center Conference at Salt Lake City. Local Councils and
Block Managers held meetings to devise methods for selecting the delegates and
writing a platform. Poston Unit 1 chose to use a general election. Nishimoto
(1995) called this the "most successful election in the Poston history" (p. 174).
The popularly elected Unit 1 delegate joined the Unit II and Unit III delegates who
had been selected by different methods.
Jackman (1955) describes how a plan to cooperate with the Office of
Wartime Information (OWI) was handled democratically. First, a special council
meeting was called to meet with the OWI representatives September 28, 1942.
Then:
The council voted to confer with block residents and report back the
following day. Block meetings were held all of that day and were attended
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by all the residents in some blocks and by block advisory committees in
other Blocks. Nearly all of the blocks had one or the other type of meeting.
The blocks then voted individually on the plan with the following results: 22
blocks voted against the plan, 21 voted for the plan with certain conditions,
and 7 voted for the plan without conditions. ... A meeting of the council,
block representatives, the OWI, the administration and about 250
interested evacuees was held. (pp. 190-192)
An additional meeting was held and the proposal lost support. (Jackman,
1955). Even though this incident eventually caused a separation between the
council and other evacuees, it does seem to indicate a persistent belief in
democracy and competence in democratic processes
Contacting a Public Official.
The second democratic method involves contacting a public official. Living
in such a restricted area, evacuees frequently came into contact with the
appointed administrative staff. However, they did not limit their contacts with
public officials to only those who worked nearby. On some occasions they
communicated with high level government policy-makers.
A loyalty test had been devised to identify those evacuees who could be
trusted and released to the outside, or inducted into the armed forces. Each
evacuee was interviewed for this purpose. Two questions generated a heated
controversy:
27. (for male Nisei) "Are you willing to serve in the armed forces of the
United States on combat duty, wherever ordered?"
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27. (for female Nisei and Issei)"... would you be willing to volunteer for the
Army Nurse Corps or the WAAC?" This badly worded question was
intended to ask if they would serve in a noncombatant capacity.
28. (for everybody)"Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the United
States of America and foreswear any form of allegiance or obedience to
the Japanese emperor, and any other foreign government, power or
organization?"
The Issei were very concerned that renouncing any loyalty to Japan, while
not having legal recourse for United States citizenship, would leave them a
stateless people, without any power to look out for their interests. Contacts with
War Relocation Authority officials prompted a revision that read:
28. "Will you swear to abide by the laws of the United States and to take
no action which would in any way interfere with the war effort of the United
States. (Weglyn, 1976, pp. 136)
The Nisei at Topaz sent a resolution to the Secretary of War explaining
they would be willing to enter military service if their civil rights were restored.
Without firm assurance from the government, military recruitment was slow
(Arrington, 1962). Similarly, the Nisei in Poston "adopted a resolution expressing
their willingness to 'give up our lives if necessary in the cause of our nation and
democracy' "and asking for return of civil rights based on their new draft status
and telegraphed a copy to President Roosevelt (Jackman, 1955). A Manzanar
Issei group proclaimed that question 28 was not legal and threatened to call the
Spanish Counsel, who as a neutral power was representing the Issei Japanese
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citizens. The question was withdrawn by the Project Director and eventually
rewritten (Weglyn, 1976).
On October 26, 1943 an organized group of evacuees confronted camp
administrators with a list of complaints. The problems unresolved, on November
1, while visiting The Tule Lake Relocation Center, National Director Dillon Myer
and several administrative heads were trapped inside the administration building
by a large group of evacuees, who demanded redress for their unresolved
complaints (Weglyn, 1976).
Another incident of contacting a public official occurred at Tule Lake where
the Spanish Consul was contacted to arbitrate a dispute between evacuees and
the army (Jackman, 1955). Also, in July of 1943 the administration at Minidoka
ordered a reduction of the evacuee paid labor force ostensibly for budget
reasons, but possibly to encourage forced relocation. The evacuees staged a
variety of responses including a strike of maintenance workers who managed
fires in the camp laundry and latrines. A group of women gathered at the office of
the Acting Project Director demanding that he insure the camp had hot water.
They also sent a telegram to the National Director of the War Relocation
Authority demanding he assure them hot water. The National Director refused to
get involved, sending a reply which stated that the dispute needed to be settled
locally (Jackman, 1955).
Protest.
The next democratic method considered is protest. While democratic
processes are often aimed at promoting commonality and accommodation,

30

democracy sometimes arises from conflict. Occasionally, in the relocation
centers it must have seemed as though protest was the only way to accomplish
goals.
Jackman (1955) provides a comprehensive analysis of protests in the
relocation centers. He identifies four types of issues that sparked protests: labor
issues, the loyalty oath, the military draft, and disputes over self-government (p.
35). He divides the category of "protest" into "negotiation of differences" and
"passive resistance and insubordination", and "overt rebellion." He found at least
twenty-six incidents of negotiation of differences and passive resistance in
Topaz, Gila River, Heart Mountain and Granada (p. 85). There were twenty-nine
incidents in the same categories in Poston, Minidoka and Jerome (p. 158). At
Manzanar and Tule Lake he found seven incidents of passive resistance and
insubordination, nine incidents of negotiation of differences, and two of overt
rebellion (pp. 217-218).
Although there were some violent protests, they were rare. Most protest
was non-violent. Two examples will help understand evacuee methods of protest.
The first occurred at Poston where, due to wartime shortages, evacuees were
told they must build their own schools and were not provided sufficient building
materials. The administration was unable to enforce the order. Evacuees
withheld their labor, and for a year and no schools were built (Yatsushiro, 1953).
The second example occurred at Manzanar, where there was labor trouble. On
August 11,1942, camouflage net factory workers went on strike over wages
(Jackman, 1955).
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Informal Community Work.
The fourth democratic method considered is informal community work.
The camps had been intentionally positioned in out of the way places and the
evacuees were faced with the task of literally building communities from the
ground up. Structured government programs would satisfy only part of the needs
of the people. Much work was accomplished through the use of informal
community work, either by individuals or collectively in groups.
Gila River Relocation Center provides an excellent example of informal
community work among evacuees. Copies of the camp newspaper, the "Gila
News-Courier", reveal many examples of voluntary community work. Articles and
announcements about YMCA meetings, volunteer adult education classes
("Organizer," 1943; Adult Education," 1943), Americanization ("Canal Camp,"
1942), social dancing ("Social Tonight," 1943) music ("Classical Music," 1943)
and theatrical performances ("Butte Theater, 1943) demonstrate that evacuees
involved themselves in voluntary associations designed to meet community
needs. Boy scouts attended meetings and USO dances were held. YMCA,
YWCA, Scouting and religious groups were available. Parents formed PTAs.
(Myer,1971). Young people helped also. When the War Relocation Authority
reduced funding for mess hall staffing, at Gila River the Young People's
Organization of Block 48 volunteered to wash dishes without pay. ("Block 48,"
1943).
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Boards and Committees.
The fifth democratic method is boards and committees. Both formal and
informal committees and boards were often used as forums for discussion and
decision making in the camps. There are many examples available for
examination.
In Poston I, administrators worked to encourage evacuee leadership to
organize their community through officially sanctioned boards and committees.
The Evacuee Civic Planning Board worked over four weeks to write a
constitution. Sadly, this board was forced into dissolution when they discovered
the War Relocation Authority had mandated a different sort of organization
excluding the Issei. The project attorney took charge to implement the official
War Relocation Authority structure and organized an election to form a
Temporary Community Council. The Council then formed a Food committee to
investigate the mess-hall and a Health Committee to investigate the hospital.
Administrators began to react negatively to this unexpected activism and sought
to block this expression of community power (Spicer, 1969).
Unofficial committees and boards also had influence. An unofficial Issei
Advisory Board which operated separately from the Nisei Council was formed at
Poston to advise and give the excluded Issei a voice, but being closer to the
feelings of the majority, they came to express greater influence and eventually
led a general strike to protest the arrest of two evacuees by the FBI (Spicer,
1969; Leighton, 1945)
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Richard Nishimoto (1995), an evacuee at Poston gives an excellent
description of how boards and committees could function effectively when
allowed to do so. He is particularly interesting when he gives a detailed
description of the widespread gambling problem created by former professional
gamblers. The evacuees' first response was ineffective, unsure and lacking
consensus. As the problem of crime associated with gambling grew unbearable,
they organized and faced the issues. Calling a meeting of various evacuee
boards, committees, councils and representatives they began a grassroots
campaign of public awareness and community opposition. The evacuee police,
bolstered by community support became more effective and the professional
gamblers wary of grassroots opposition backed down. Soon, gambling was
restricted to small friendly games with community approval. The community had
succeeded without administration help. After it was all over, the Project Director
issued a notice condemning gambling. But, the problem had already been solved
by grassroots citizen action and effective utilization of existing political structures
(pp. 144-146,148-159).
A War Relocation Authority imposed job pay classification system allotted
only 12-16 dollars per month for evacuee workers, far below the union scale
wages they had been promised at the beginning of the evacuation. A serious
manpower shortage at Poston promoted the formation of a combined group of
staff, Issei and Nisei to form a Manpower Commission to study the problem. One
notable outcome was a reclassification of all jobs from the civil service scheme of
managerial, professional, and unskilled to a more relevant system based on
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rewarding those who contributed to the community's life, health and security
(Yatsushiro, 1953).
Other examples of special community organizations were the Library
commission, and the rest home board to establish a home for the elderly (Hass,
1943).
Political Organizations.
The next democratic method considered is the formation of political
organizations. No evidence was available to indicate the evacuees organized
themselves in any way reminiscent of traditional American political parties. Much
of the organized activity seemed to center around the different views and
conflicts between evacuees and administrators, and between factions of
evacuees.
Ad hoc organizations, intended to respond to specific issues were
abundant. At Manzanar various grassroots political organizations were formed.
Supporters of the war effort joined the Manzanar Citizens Federation to
encourage military service and generally down play the evacuee situation as less
important than the war itself (Weglyn, 1976). A Kitchen Workers Union was
formed to oppose the administration Fair Practice Committee whose job was to
hear complaints, regulate work and increase production. This Union was to
become noted for their demands for an investigation into perceived
administration poor accounting of the sugar ration (Jackman, 1955). The Heart
Mountain Fair Play committee campaigned against the military draft of the Nisei
and attracted large crowds in defiance of a ban on assembly (Okihiro, 1996).
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Contributions to a Political Cause.
The final category of democratic methods relates to contributions to a
political cause. Political discourse within the camps was carried out in an austere
environment. No evidence of monetary contributions for political purposes was
uncovered during this research.
Research Strategy 2: Interview Data and Comparative Analysis
This section focuses on interview data in which former evacuees revealed
information describing their own political and civic behavior. The interview
questions were divided in two four groups clustering related questions into
modes of related activities. These modes are: political socialization, political
cognition, obligation to participate, and membership in voluntary associations.
This study asks specific questions of a narrowly defined population. Other
similar questions have been asked elsewhere in other studies. For comparative
purposes, data from original Almond and Verba (1963) study were used. The
time differences present no real barrier to comparison so long as they are taken
into account during the analysis so, more current data from the Citizen
Participation Study (Verba, Schlozman & Brady, 1995) and 1996 voting data
(Brunner, 1998, p. 65) were used to supplement the original 1963 survey data.
Through this method, I am comparing the Evacuee responses to the United
States data from 1963,1995 and 1996. In all cases, there are instances in which
question wording was not identical to wording used in this study, however,
wording in all cases was close enough to be considered equivalent. The
combined United States data provides a model for a democratic society.

36

Political Socialization.
Political socialization addresses the nonpolitical knowledge and skills
acquired by individuals from their family and associations such as school and
workplace. Those who grow up learning associations in which participation and
influence of the individual is normative are likely to take this same view as adults
and participate with the expectation of having influence. The argument is that
sense of political competence in adults originates in their early experiences at
home, in school and in the workplace. These early non-political primary
experiences are the foundations upon which political behaviors are based.
Almond and Verba (1963) point out that this is "a complex set of relationships"
(p. 266) and that a view of the "political system as family writ large" is simplistic
(p. 268). Tables 1 and 2 depict former Evacuee responses to questions on
remembered family participation.
Table 1
Early participation in family decisions (pre-evacuation).
Percentage who remember
they had *

Evacuees
(N = 10)

US (1963)
(N = 970)

Some influence

50

73

No influence

50

22

0

5

Don't know or don't remember

*Actual text of the question: "As you were growing up, let's say when you were
around sixteen, how much influence do you remember having in family decision
affecting yourself? Did you have much influence, some, or none at all?
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The former Evacuees seem to remember less opportunity to participate in
family decision making than the general US population.
Much of the available literature on Japanese American family life in this
era concentrates on conflict between the elderly Issei and their Nisei children.
Issei are often portrayed as stern, strict and unforgiving. While most
interviewee's comments seemed to support this notion, they generally felt that
their parents were caring and had their children's best interest at heart. Only one
respondent felt bitterly about his father's relationship to the son. The family
structures they described were not obviously participatory. A most frequent
comment was that the parents listened to what the children had to say and then
did what they thought was best, and it was very difficult to change the parents'
minds. Although some were adamantly negative. "A Nisei male responded
"zero!" Another said, "I didn't have practically any."
Table 2
Perceived freedom to dissent within the family (pre-evacuation).
Percentage who felt *

Evacuees
OSI = 10)

US (1963)
(N = 970)

Free to complain

80

52

Uneasy

0

13

20

29

0

6

Not free to complain
Don't Remember

* Actual text of the question: "At around the same time, if a decision were made
that you didn't like, did you feel free to complain, did you feel a little uneasy about
complaining, or was it better not to complain?"
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This question addresses the issue of adult political competence. Those
people who feel subjectively that they can influence people and events are more
likely to be politically active. Persons in political office then must pay attention to
such people because ignoring them might adversely affect their support. So,
officials are compelled to act in their behalf. The act of successful influence then
adds to the individual's sense of competence.
Former Evacuees usually felt free to complain at a rate higher than the
general US population, but most stated that while they did not fear complaining,
their family's primary decision-maker was not likely to be influenced by the
complaint.
Half of the respondents had no reluctance to complain, half did. Of those
who felt complaining was acceptable, they still felt it did no good. Most still
believe today that individual complaining is usually futile. Issues should be
addressed by groups not individuals. One respondent stated that while he was
free to complain, it never did any good. Another said "My father would get mad
at me when I expressed my opinion." Three of the respondents stated that they
felt this was common among all relationships between parents and teens.
Almond and Verba divide competence into two types, political competence
and administrative competence. Political competence reflects the individual's
perception of his ability to influence public policy. Administrative competence
reflects the individual's perception of his ability to affect policy in a situation
which is immediate and personally relevant. Administrative competence is
measured by questions related to the individual's feelings about his relationship
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to hypothetical situations in which potentially harmful rules or regulations are
being considered and the individual's relationship to the bureaucracy is under
consideration. This is not a measure of actual efficacy; the government's
response to the people is not measured in this method, only individual's
perceptions and feelings. So, there may be a difference between the
perceptions and reality. Table 3 depicts the former Evacuees' expectations of
fair and equal treatment now.
Table 3
Expectations of fairness (1998)
Evacuees
(N = 10)

US (1963)
(N = 970)

They expect equal treatment

90

83

They don't expect equal treatment

10

9

Depends

0

4

Don't know

0

4

Percentage who say *

*Actual Text of the question: "Suppose there were some question that you had
to take to a government office - for example, a tax question or housing
regulation. Do you think you would be given equal treatment - 1 mean, would you
be treated as well as anyone else?"
Expectations of treatment by government bureaucracy measures
expectations of fairness. This question assumes that everyone wants to be
treated equally. Bureaucracy has a reputation for being impersonal and
unresponsive. The question does not ask if the respondents expected to achieve
a desired outcome, only if they would be treated fairly.
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As Table 3 shows, the former Evacuees have an expectation of fair and
equal treatment comparable to the general US population. Several respondents
asked for clarification to verify that the question referred to a government office,
implying that if the scenario had referred to a non-government situation the
answer may be different. One respondent simply said, "I don't think so." Another
said "I think I would get equal treatment in this day and age." Another
commented " I feel I get treated the same. I've never had any problems like
that."
Patterns of Political Communication.
People must be willing to discuss political issues. They must see some
measure of value in such discussion and believe political discussion is safe,
without untoward effects. Such discussion must take place in an atmosphere of
relative freedom and with confidence. Table 4 depicts interest, confidence and
willingness to discuss political issues.
Table 4
Frequency of talking politics with other people (1998)
Percentage who report they*

Evacuees
(N = 10)

Never talk politics

60

24

Sometimes talk politics

40

76

Other and don't know

0

US (1963)
(N = 970)

0

*Actual text of the question: "What about talking about talking about public affairs
to other people? Do you do that nearly every day, once a week, from time to
time, or never?"
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Former Evacuees do sometimes talk about politics, but they do it
differently than the general US population. They talk politics at about half the rate
of the general US population.
A Nisei female replied, "We don't care about public affairs." A Nisei male
responded, "Sometimes when we have spare time, if we're not talking about
something else."
Patterns of political cognition.
Questions asked in this category address awareness and knowledge of
the political system. We assume that awareness and knowledge of political
affairs is a necessary precursor to active participation and that to some extent,
awareness and knowledge influences type and degree of both participation and
effectiveness. Tables 5 and 6 tell us something about political cognition among
former Japanese American Evacuees.
Table 5
Following the accounts of political affairs (1998)

Percentage who report they
follow accounts*

Evacuees
(N = 10)

U S (1963)
(N == 970)

Regularly

30

27

From time to time

20

53

Never

50

19

0

1

Other and don't know
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*Actual text of the question: "Do you follow the accounts of political and
governmental affairs? Would you say you follow them regularly, from time to
time, or never?"
The number of former Evacuees who regularly follow accounts of political
affairs are comparable to the general US population, but the "from time to time"
and "never" categories are inverted. The former Evacuee "never" responses
occur more than twice as often as that of the general US population.
Table 6
Following reports of public affairs in the media (1998)
Percentage who follow accounts of*

Evacuees
(N = 10)

U S (1963)
(N == 970)

Newspapers at least weekly

100

49

Radio or television at least weekly

100

58

20

57

In magazines (ever)

of political and governmental affairs in the newspapers nearly every day, about
once a week, from time to time, or never?" "What about on the radio or
television? Do you listen to accounts of public affairs nearly every day, about
once a week, from time to time or never?" "What about magazines? Do you
read about public affairs in magazines about once a week, from time to time, or
never?"
Former Evacuees are paying attention to public affairs at a rate twice that
of the general US population, though it may not translate into public

43

performance. A Nisei male answered, "I read the paper every day and I have my
own ideas as to what it's all about, but what the hell can you do?" A Nisei
female responded, I always have it on my mind." Another Nisei male answered,
"No, except for Clinton and I'm not even sure if that's politics."
The obligation to participate.
Voting and participation in political campaigns are perhaps the most
commonly accepted vision of American democracy. Both involve a degree of
interest, confidence and trust in the electoral process. Disinterested or alienated
persons disengage. An orientation toward electoral campaigns indicates a belief
that they are necessary and have value. Absence of electoral activity shows
either apathy or a rejection of the process. Voting exerts influence over public
leaders. Voting is not a collective act; it is an individual act regulated by specific
infrequent opportunities to act. Elections are competitive activities, so voting
involves the voter in conflict. Table 7 depicts evacuee voting activity in a national
election.
Table 7
Post - Evacuation Voting (1998)
Percentage who voted in last presidential election *
Evacuees (N = 10)

60

United States ( Brunner.1996)

49.1

*Actual text of the question: "Did you vote in the last Presidential election?"
This number is significant. Japanese Americans tend to register to vote at
a lower rate than the population in general. Lien (1997) reports that 37% of
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eligible Japanese Americans registered to vote in San Francisco in 1984, while
60% of the general electorate registered at the same time. In this case, the
evacuee registration rate is greater than that of the general electorate.
One Nisei female smiled and answered, "The first one was Truman. After
that I didn't bother anymore." Another became excited when she heard the
question and answered proudly, "Every one!"
Campaigning is a more complicated and potentially more powerful act
than simple voting. Campaign activity is also part of the electoral process and is
closely related to voting. Participation in a political campaign can be a more
powerful influence than simply voting, because the participant has the
opportunity to influence many others. Campaigns depend heavily on the
dissemination of information and that information allows people to make choices
and join groups of similar thinking persons. Table 8 shows former Evacuee
responses regarding their campaign participation.
Table 8
Participation in a Political Campaign (1998)
Evacuees
(N = 10)

US (1995)
(N = 2,517)

Worked for a candidate or party

20

8

Contributed monev

30

24

Percentage of respondents who*

*Actual text of the question: "Have you ever been active in a political campaign?
That is, have you ever worked for a candidate or party, contributed money, or
done any other active work?"

45

Although one-half of the respondents had never participated in a political
campaign, their rates of participation are still higher than the general population.
Those who had never participated seemed strongly ambivalent toward
political campaigns. A Nisei male answered "Zero - no." Another stated "No,
only during redress."
Sense of political competence.
Tables 9 and 10 were designed to get some notion of the respondents'
views of their political competence (perceived ability to influence government)
and of possible strategies they might employ to influence a government
decision. Strategy is just as important as the willingness to participate. In a
democracy, numbers count. Acting alone such as voting, is a very different
approach than grassroots organizing, and with likely different outcomes.
Table 9 depicts the percentage of respondents who feel they can do
something to change an unjust law they consider harmful.
Table 9
Perceived likelihood of success in influencing a government decision (1998)
Percentage who said they were*
Likely to succeed

Evacuees
(N = 10)
10

U S (1963)
(N = 970)
77

Not Likely to succeed

40

23

It is obvious from the answers to this question than former Evacuees feel their
likelihood of success to be much lower than the general US population. Half of
the respondents (50%) indicated they believed it depended on the situation.
Strategies respondents would employ are listed in Table 10.
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Table 10
Type of action they would take to influence government (1998)

Directly contact political leaders

Evacuees
(N = 10)
30

U S (1963)
(N = 970)
20

Vote

10

14

Try to enlist aid of others

10

59

Protest

20

0

0

7

30

Q

Percentage of respondents who would*

Other
Nothing

*Actual text of the questions: "Suppose a law were being considered by your
local government that you considered very unjust or harmful. What do you think
you could do? Anything else? If you made an effort to change this law, how likely
is it that you would succeed?"
At first glance, this data seem to contradict data in Table 12. At only 10
percent, those who would try to enlist the aid of others seems odd when
compared to their high rate of membership in voluntary associations. However,
the question in Table 10 places the burden for action on the individual and goes
far beyond mere membership in an association. This may also be associated
with the perceived low likelihood of success as shown in Table 9. There is a
rather high response rate for engaging in protest to influence government.
Throughout the interviews the word "protest" was used frequently. Those who
would do nothing (30%) contrasts with the general population who did not seem
to even consider the possibility.
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A Nisei female answered, "Usually in these things the JACL in on top of it."
A Nisei male responded, "Nothing, I'd just let it go down the drain." Another
Nisei female simply said, "Don't rock the boat."
Table 11
Percentage who say they have tried to influence a government decision (1998)
Percentage who said*
Yes, they had

Evacuees
(N = 100
50

US (1963)
(N = 745)
33

No. they had not

50

67

* Actual text of the question: "Have you ever done anything to try to influence a
government decision?"
Although at 50 % the Evacuees responded "yes" at a noticeably higher
rate than the general population, I had expected that all respondents would
answer "yes", since all were members of the JACL and had supported redress.
Possibly, some had provided only "checkbook" support for redress and the "yes"
answers referred to other issues. One Nisei male related a personal story. "We
all stuck together and voted against (a politician who did not support redress). I
feel our Japanese community did some good (helped defeat the politician's bid
for reelection).
Voluntary Organizational Membership.
Membership in a voluntary association implies interest beyond that of the
individual. Although the organization can represent the individual's needs, and
through larger numbers possibly be more effective, the act of association
involves participation and interaction. Simple membership is not an absolute
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indicator of true participation. Some members are "free riders" sharing in the
benefits, but contributing little. This activity is not usually directly related to the
electoral process, but though communication of information to individuals allows
them to make informed choices and pressure leaders. Voluntary associations
may act as mediators between individuals and political authority. Tables 12, 13
and 14 depict former Evacuee involvement in voluntary associations.
Table 12
Distribution of Voluntary Association Membership (1998)
Membership by percentage*

Evacuees
(N = 10)

US (1995)
(N = 2.517)

Yes

100

79

* Actual text of the question: "Have you ever been a member of any
organizations (labor unions, business organizations, social groups, professional
or farm organizations, cooperatives, fraternal or veterans' groups, athletic clubs,
political, charitable, civic, or religious organizations) or any other organized
group?"
Organizational membership has dramatically changed since the 1963
survey. Fewer Americans are joining voluntary associations (Putnam, 1995),
though former Evacuees appear to join at a high rate. Membership in the
Japanese American Citizen League was common to all former Evacuees.
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Table 13
Officership in a voluntary association (1998)
Officership by percentage (of those responding "yes" above)*
Evacuees
(N = 10)
Yes
50

US (1995)
(N = 1.988)
28

No

72

50

*Actual text of the question: "Were you ever an officer in this (one of these)
organization(s)?"
Table 13 depicts a rather high incidence of Officership in voluntary
associations. Respondents did not seem to seek out Officership, however. As
one Nisei male who had been an officer several time described it "There was
nobody else who would do the job."
Table 14
Affiliation by type of organization. Percentage exceeds 100 due to multiple
affiliations. (1998)
Respondent membership by type*

Evacuees
(N = 10)

Unions

40

12

Social

60

74

Religious

40

12

Veterans'

20

20

Civic

30

47

Professional/Business

10

23

Political

100

48

Cultural

100

13

50

US (1995)
(N = 2,517)

* Actual text of the question: Of those responding "yes" to above, "Which ones?"
Each person who responded positively to union membership indicated
that joining a labor union was a merely a condition of employment and then
expressed generally anti-union feelings. Membership in the Japanese American
Citizen League was considered both a cultural and a political affiliation, which
accounts for the one hundred percentile ratings in those categories. JACL
membership was common to all respondents.
Effects of the Evacuation on Political Behavior
The Japanese American Evacuees have gone through a unique
experience. On the one hand taught at an early age to be good citizens, while
on the other specifically singled out for mass denial of the rights normally
accorded to good citizens. The following questions as shown in Tables 15
through 22 were devised in an effort to determine what, if any, impact the
evacuation and internment had on their perception of government.
Table 15
Reported interest and involvement (N = 10)
Percentage who responded they*

Civic Affairs

Government

Became more interested and involved

30

30

Became less interested and involved

10

10

Had no change in interest and involvement

60

60

* Actual text of the questions: "How did your experiences during the
evacuation affect your interest and involvement in civic affairs? How did your
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experiences during the evacuation affect your interest and involvement in local,
state, or national government?"
The former Evacuees reported identical answers for interest in civic affairs
and government. One respondent reported that he became disillusioned and
angry when, in high school in the relocation center, he was taught the merits of
democracy. A Nisei male answered "I was interested until the redress program
was finished, then I could finally say we did our duty." He continued "I learned
the government meant business." A previously apathetic Nisei female became
strongly more interested. A Nisei male commented " When I studied civics in
school (in a relocation center) I was always shaking my head, wondering what
the hell was going on." While a Nisei female stated "Just follow the crowd." The
young age of most respondents at time of evacuation is probably a factor in
these answers.
Of those who reported increased interest in government, only one stated a
preference for level of government, national. The others reported equal interest
in local, state, and national government affairs.
Table 16
Before and after evacuation view of government (N = 10)
Percentage who reported*
A difference

20

No difference

80

52

* Actual text of the question: "Think now of the life you led before evacuation
and of the life you led after evacuation. Is there a difference in how you view
government?"
Only twenty percent reported a difference between their pre-evacuation
and post-evacuation view of government. One who reported no change stated "I
still love it!" Another stated the evacuation experience created a much greater
willingness to question the motives of government. Fifty percent stated that they
were teenagers during evacuation, and at that age were not interested in either
civic or government affairs. These same respondents reported little interest as
post-evacuation adults. A Nisei male answered "I didn't even think about
government and nothing's changed." Another responded, "I had more
confidence in it after the war. But, it would have changed regardless of whether I
went to the evacuation or not."
Table 17
Pre-evacuation Voting patterns (N = 10)
Percentage of those who reported*
Voting at least once

0

Not voting

100

* Actual text of the question: "Did you ever vote in a presidential, state or local
election before the evacuation?"
Only three respondents were old enough to vote before the evacuation
and they could not remember voting in any election. All other respondents were
under the required legal age for voting.
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Table 18
Voting patterns During Evacuation (N = 10)
Percentage of those who reported'
Voting

0

Not voting

100

* Actual text of the question: "Were there any elections held at (name of
relocation center)? Did you vote? Did you run for any elective office?
Only three respondents remembered elections of any type being held at
their relocation center. One mentioned mock elections in high school. Again, all
but three were too young to have participated in voting activity. Four commented
that they believed those who served on committees and councils were
volunteers. A Nisei male answered "There were block elections, but I had no
use for it. At the time who give a damn what the government was telling us to
do. All we were interested in was sports." A Nisei female commented "I don't
remember. They just do what they want."
Table 19
Committee membership (N = 10)
Percentage who reported*
committee membership in a relocation center

20

no committee membership in a relocation center

80

* Actual text of the question: "Were there any committees at (name of relocation
center) to help organize and run things? (If yes) Were the members of these
committees elected or appointed? Did you ever serve on a committee? Did this
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(these) committee(s) have a positive influence on life at (name of relocation
center)?"
Eighty percent reported knowledge of committees at their relocation
centers, but none remembered how members were selected to serve. Two
respondents actually served on informal committees, and all but one agreed the
committees had a positive influence on camp community life. One Nisei male
summed up the general feeling of all when he said that at the time, "I just wasn't
interested."
Table 20
Work ethic in relocation centers (N = 10)
Percentage who reported that*
Their work had a positive influence

100

Their work did not have a positive influence

0

* Actual text of the questions: "Did you have a job while at (name of relocation
center)? If yes, what kind of job? Do you feel the kind of work you did made a
positive contribution to the (name of relocation center) community?"
Several respondents had more than one job. Two reported that job skills
learned inside the relocation center were useful after leaving camp. Four
respondents held only part time jobs while attending high school. None reported
that their jobs were useless or "make work". Most indicated that there was more
than enough useful work in their communities to keep everyone busy. One Nisei
male disagreed. He said "There was a lot of flunky jobs - they had to have them
do something to stay busy."
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Limited by the structure of relocation center life, protest sometimes became
an outlet for expression of wants and preferences. Tables 21 and 22 address the
issue of protest in relocation centers.
Table 21
Participation in a Protest (N = 10)
Percentage who reported they had seen a protest*
Yes

40

No

60

Table 22
Feelings toward protest
Of those who reported yes, percentage who reported*
Protest had a positive influence

0

Protest had a negative influence

100

* Actual text of the question: "I have heard that sometimes evacuees would
protest government in the relocation centers. Did you see any protests in (name
of relocation center)? (If yes) Were you involved in any protests? Did the(se)
protest(s) have a positive influence on life at (name of relocation center)?"
While the question asked if respondents had "seen" a protest, those who
answered yes, clarified that they had actually "heard" or "heard about" a protest.
No respondents admitted to participating In protest or personally observing one;
they stated that they stayed physically far away so as to avoid possible injury.
One respondent did participate in a protest in an Army run assembly
center, but that information was not included in this data. Four respondents
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expressed their belief that the protests were engineered by the Kibei, who were
described as "troublemakers". A Nisei female commented "We had a classmate
who died" and "Through curiosity they go to see." Another related "It was eerie
cause they had this bell, the mess hall bell, and on and on they sounded that
bell."
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
In 1941 the Japanese in America were generally considered to be
heirs to a non-democratic tradition. This was not simply an issue of people
lacking the proper political and organizational skills, but by inference
describes a people whose traditions of association and civic engagement
would negatively affect their political behavior.
Kitano (as cited in Taylor, 1993) observed that for many evacuees, the
limited experience in participatory democracy inside a relocation center was their
first of that type. Political behaviors such as "block votes, community services
community decisions, and the like, provided a taste of 'ideal' community
democracy, the likes of which few Americans have ever seen" (p. 133).
Although it may have been their first attempt at participatory government,
they seem to have proven themselves to be persistent and able democrats.
Research strategy 1 revealed substantial anecdotal evidence to support the
contention that the Japanese American evacuees displayed political and civic
behaviors that were consistent with American style democracy. Eight of the nine
categories of political participation were met. Absence of support for the ninth
category may be more indicative of research limitations than actual absence of
this category of behavior.
This conclusion is further supported by an informed observation made by
the Project Attorney at Poston.
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There were some who were inclined to think that the residents lacked the
knowledge of self government. They were unaware that although few had
held public offices, the Japanese communities had many organizations
and had solved by themselves most of their internal problems such as
crimes, delinquencies, and poverty, without resorting to courts or private
or governmental relief agencies. No Robert's Rules of Procedure, a few
copies of which were sent to the projects, were needed for an orderly
meeting (Haas, 1943, p. 63).
The participatory procedures in the relocation centers were designed by
government administrators and reflected a bureaucratic approach rather than a
true democratic approach to governance. Evacuee political behavior in these
circumstances was a reflection of both their family structure and culture as
permissible within physical and structural boundaries of camp life. Theoretical
approaches for citizen education are meaningless unless the citizens actually
require education. Perhaps by concentrating on similarities rather than
differences, we will find answers we can all live with. A high school student at
Topaz commented on the Caucasian school teachers", many of them, do not
understand us, but I think that if they work with us, we might gradually be known
to the American people as American." (Sugihara, 1943, p. 38)
Since the staff of the relocation centers was appointed by the War
Relocation Authority and not elected, the structure more resembled a
bureaucratic agency than a democracy in action. Policy-making was generally
centralized at the national level, with individual Project Directors and staff allotted
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administrative and technical tasks. The War Relocation Authority sponsored
evacuee councils were most often literally employees of the administration, or as
Daniels (in Taylor, 1993) described them, "trustees" (p. 133). In such cases
ordinary evacuee influence was often indirect, with the members' participation
restricted to stating opinions which the administration was free to ignore. Informal
groups that arose, such as the Issei Council, were similar to modern citizen's
advisory councils and reflected a genuine move toward citizen participation in
democratic processes.
The events listed in research strategy 1 are not all encompassing.
Certainly other, non-democratic behaviors also existed, however, the presence of
committees, councils, elections and a tenacious attempt at participatory decisionmaking make a strong case for supporting the hypotheses.
Research strategy 2 served three purposes. The first was to supplement
strategy 1 and confirm or dispute strategy 1 as to political behaviors inside the
relocation centers. The second purpose was to explore political behaviors after
evacuation. Finally, the third purpose was to explore the possibility of cultural and
family influence on their political behaviors.
Evacuee political behaviors after release from the relocation centers
appears wholly consistent with the American democratic model. They vote at a
rate comparable with other Americans. They join and participate in various
voluntary organizational activities. When motivated to do so, they participate in
political campaigns. Two notable differences were discovered. Their strategies
of influence tend to be strongly based on collective approaches and they seem to
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have a somewhat lower expectation of success in influencing government. Only
two respondents seemed to be independently politically active. Others generally
traced much of their activity to involvement with the JACL. In these cases the
JACL acts as a power broker in their behalf and the individual's sense of political
efficacy is tied to the JACL as a mediating structure.
The attempt at finding a correlation between early cultural influences on
political behavior was inconclusive and their influence on political culture remains
uncertain. Respondents admitted that their parents, particularly the fathers, were
strict, but strongly believed their parents had the children's best interest in mind.
It is possible that values, attitudes and behavior acquired in childhood are
pervasive, but not compelling. Interview responses seem to suggest the
evacuees are aware of a tendency to be politically passive, but make conscious
decisions to become politically engaged when necessary, at least on issues that
are important to them. One Nisei male respondent made the following
observation.
A lot of people will tell you a lot of things now because they know a little bit
more now than they did before when they were in camp. Ninety-nine
percent of them were people that were followers. Japanese people are
followers; they're not leaders. And if they do get a leader watch out, he's a
SOB, a smart SOB.
The various rationale behind the Japanese American Evacuation have not
lost relevance. In 1982, a Chinese American named Vincent Chin was beaten to
death by disgruntled Caucasian automotive workers who thought Chin was
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Japanese. In 1990, a Vietnamese immigrant was beaten by African Americans
because they mistook him for Korean (Min, 1995). During the gulf war, anti-Arab
sentiment was aroused. Arab Americans found themselves facing a dramatic
increase in the number of hate crimes directed against them, and President
George Bush ordered the FBI to place Arab American leaders under surveillance
(Abraham, 1994).
If the issue of assimilation into American democracy is to be resolved, the
resolution must take place on the level of democracy and that resolution must be
both rational and consistent with democratic principles. The pragmatics of
American history have a habit of brushing aside legal niceties in the rush of
events, and have proven time and again the elasticity of constitutions and laws.
Democracy cannot survive without democratic inquiry. At this point, the issues of
loyalty or political efficacy are no longer on trial, but rather the integrity of the
American nation and its processes of public policy making. The lessons of this
history are that fear makes people desperate for simple solutions, and that rights
are relative to the perceived interests of the nation. Reason doesn't sleep in this
scenario it sleepwalks, like in a nightmare.

62

References
Abraham, N. (1994). Anti-Arab racism and violence in the United States.
The Development of Arab-American Identity. McCarus, Ernest. (Ed.). Ann Arbor,
Ml: The University of Michigan Press, pp. 155-214.
Almond , G. and Verba, S. (1963). The civic culture: Political attitudes and
democracy in five nations. Boston: Little, Brown and Co.
Arrington, L. J. (1962). The price of prejudice: The Japanese American
relocation center in Utah during World War II. Logan, UT: Utah State University.
Blau, P.M. (1974). Presidential address: Parameters of social structure.
American Sociological Review. 39, 615-635.
Blau, P.M. (1977). A macrosocial theory of social structure. American
Journal of Sociology. 83, 26-54.
Block 28 youths serve. (1943, August 31). Gila News-Courier, p. 2.
Bosworth, A.R. (1967). America's concentration camps. New York: W.W.
Norton & Co.
Broom, L., & Kitsuse, J.I. (1956). The managed casualty: The Japanese
American family in World War II. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Brunner, B. (Ed.). (1998). 1998 Information please almanac: Boston:
Information Please LLC.
Butte theater. (1943, March 2). Gila News-Courier, p. 2.
Canal camp adult classes to start. (1942, October 10). Gila News-Courier.
p. 3.

R-1

Chung, O.K. (1992). Asian cultural commonalties: A comparison with
mainstream American culture. In S.M. Furuto, R. Biswas, O.K. Chung, K.
Murase, & F. Ross - Sheriff (Eds.), Social Work Practice With Asian Americans,
(pp. 27-44). Newbury Park, CA: SAGE.
Classical music concert slated tonight. (1943, March 2). Gila NewsCourier, p.3.
Daniels, R. (Ed.). (1989). American concentration camps Vol 1-9. New
York: Garland.
Dawson, M. (1994). Behind the mule: Race and class in African American politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
De la Garza, R., DeSipo, L, Garcia, F.C., Garcia, J., & Falcon, A. (1992).
Latin voices: Mexican. Puerto Rican. and Cuban perspectives on American
politics. Boulder, CO: Westover Press.
Eaton, A. H. (1952). Beauty behind barbed wire: The arts of the Japanese
.in our war relocation camps. New York: Harper.
Foner, P.S., & Rosenberg, D. (1993). Racism, dissent, and Asian
Americans from 1850 to the present: A documentary history. Westport, CT:
Greenwood Press.
Fugita, S.S., & O'Brien, D.J. (1991). Japanese American ethnicity: The
persistence of community. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press.
Gorfinkel, C. (Ed.). (1995). The evacuation diary of Hatsuve Egami.
Pasadena, CA: International Productions.

R-2

Gridner, A., & Loftis, A. (1969). The great betrayal: The evacuation of the
Japanese Americans during World War II. New York: MacMillan.
Grodzins, M. (1949). Americans betrayed: Politics and the Japanese
evacuation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Haas, T. H. (1943). Notes on community government. Colorado River
Relocation Center: War Relocation Authority.
Harmon, G. D. (1949). Sixty years of Indian affairs: Political, economic.
and diplomatic 1789-1850. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press.
Hatamiya, L. T. (1993). Righting a wrong: Japanese Americans and the
passage of the Civil Liberties Act of 1988. Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press.
Hayashi, H. (1983). Self-identity of the Japanese Americans during the
internment period: An archival research. Unpublished Doctoral dissertation.
University of California, Los Angeles.
Henkin, A. B., & Nguyen, L. T. (1981). Between two cultures: The
Vietnamese in America. Saratoga, CA: R and R Publishers.
Hopkinson, S. L. (1951). An historical account of the evacuation,
relocation, and resettlement of the Japanese in the United States. 1941 -1945.
Hollywood, CA: Sundance Books.
Ishimaru, T.G. (1943). History of the temporary community council.
Colorado River Relocation Center: War Relocation Authority.
Jackman, N. R. (1955). Collective protest in relocation centers.
Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of California, Berkeley.

R-3

Kelly, L. C. (1983). The assault on assimilation: John Collier and the
origins of Indian policy reform. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.
Kitano, H. H.L. (1969). Japanese Americans: The evolution of a
subculture. Englewood Cliffs NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Krammer, A. (1997). Undue process: The untold story of America's
German alien internees. New York: Rowman & Littlefield.
Leighton, A. H. (1945). The governing of men: General principles and
recommendations based on experiences at a Japanese relocation camp.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Lien, P. (1997). The political participation of Asian Americans: Voting
behavior in Southern California. New York: Garland.
McDaid, T.M. (1969). The response of the American Civil Liberties Union
to the Japanese American internment. Unpublished master's thesis, Columbia
University, New York.
Min, P.G. (1995). An overview of Asian Americans. In P.G. Min (Ed.),
Asian Americans: Contemporary Trends and Issues, (pp. 10 - 37). Thousand
Oaks, CA: SAGE.
Myer, D. S. (1971). Uprooted Americans: The Japanese Americans and
the War Relocation Authority during World War II. Tucson, AZ: University of
Arizona Press.
Nelson, D. W. (1976). Heart Mountain: The history of an American
concentration camp. Madison, Wl: Department of History, University of
Wisconsin.

R-4

Nishimoto, R. S. (1995). Inside an American concentration camp:
Japanese American resistance at Poston. Arizona. Tucson, AZ: University of
Arizona Press.
Oda, J. (1980). Heroic struggles of Japanese Americans: Partisan fighters
from America's concentration camps. Los Angeles: KNI.
Okihiro, G. Y. (1996). Whispered silences: Japanese Americans and
World War II. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press.
Organizer of YMCA, HI-Y group to visit Rivers. (1943, June 26). Gila
News-Courier, p. 5.
Pomeroy, W. J. (1974). An American made tragedy: Neo-colonialism &
dictatorship in the Philippines. New York: International Publishers.
Putnam, R. D. (1993). Making democracy work. Civic traditions in modern
Italy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Putnam, R. D. (1995). Bowling alone: America's declining social capital.
Journal of Democracy. 6(1), 65 - 78.
Rogers, E.M., & Kinkaid, D.L. (1981). Communication networks: Toward a
new paradigm for research. New York: The Free Press.
Savale, J. (1979). The first Indochinese resettlement education
conference: Opening remarks. Pp. Vii-ix. An Introduction to Indochinese History,
Culture, Language and Life-for Persons Involved with the Indochinese Refugee
Education and Resettlement Project in the State of Michigan. John K. Whitmore
(Ed). Ann Arbor, Ml: Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies The
University of Michigan

R-5

Sherif, M. & Sherif, C.W. (1953). Groups in harmony and tension. New
York: Harper.
Smith, P. (1995). Democracy on trial: The Japanese American evacuation
and relocation in World War II. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Social tonight. (1943, August 24). Gila News-Courier, p. 2.
Spicer, E.H. (1969). Impounded people: Japanese Americans in the
relocation centers. Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press.
Stanley, P. W. (1974). A nation in the making: The Philippines and the
United States 1899-1921. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Sugihara, G. (1943). War, evacuation, resettlement, and the graduating
seniors. Topaz, UT: War Relocation Authority, Central Utah Project.
Taylor, S.C. (1993). Jewel of the desert: Japanese American internment at
Topaz. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
United States. Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of
Civilians. (1982). Personal justice denied: Report of the Commission on Wartime
Relocation and Internment of Civilians. (Publication No. Y 3.W 19/10J 98).
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
United States. War Relocation Authority. (1947). Relocation camps. 1942 1945. War Relocation Authority, community analysis section. Photocopy.
Hollywood, CA: Sundance Books.
Verba, S., Schlozman, K. L , & Brady, H. E. (1995). Voice and equality:
Civic voluntarism in American politics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

R-6

Verba, S., Norman, H., & Kim, J. (1978). Participation and political
equality: A seven nation comparison. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Verba, S. & Nie, N.H. (1972). Participation in America: Political democracy
and social equality. New York: Harper.
Weglyn, M. (1976). Years of infamy: The untold story of America's
concentration camps. New York: Morrow.
Wellman, B. (1988). Structural analysis: From method and metaphor to
theory and substance. In B. Wellman & S.D. Berkowitz (Eds.), Social Structures:
A Network Approach, (pp. 19-61). New York: The Free Press.
Yatsushiro, T. (1953). Political and socio - cultural issues at Poston and
Manzanar relocation centers: A themal analysis. Unpublished Doctoral Thesis,
Cornell University, New York.

R-7

APPENDIX A

Japanese American
Concentration Camp
installation
by
MASUMI HAYASHI

The artist statement and text accompanying the series of photographs used in the
exhibition Masumi Hayashi curated by Lisa Stamanis for the Reed Whipple Cultural
Center in Las Vegas, Nevada, from April 9th, 1998, to June 10th, 1998. This
installation includes panoramic photo collages of the internment camp sites 50 years later,
audio interviews of internees, a website with this information and photographs, some
photographs from Las Vegas residents who were interned in these camps.
Access the website at:

;

http://\v\v\v.csu9hio.edu/art_photos/
; A-1
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3. Exclusion order no. 5.
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GitaTRiver relocation center.
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Granada relocation center.
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Heart Mountain relocation center.
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Jerome relocation center.
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Manzanar relocation center.
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Poston relocation center.

12.

Topaz relocation center.
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Tule Lake relocation center.
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Audio interviews.
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MASUMIHAYASHI
December 1996.

The installation "American concentration camps" is about a collective memory of the camps
that "interned" 120,000 Japanese Americans during World War n without trial Its
memories are about the reconstruction of that time and space fifty years later. It is about
transition of the immigrant Japanese American people caught between two countries at war,
people caught without a country would claim them as their own. It is about their collective
voices and memories of that displacement It is about a quiet silence that surrounds the land,
those prison cities, and that time.

With the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the Japanese Americans in America were no longer seen
by other vA^mericans as industrious, immigrant neighbors but were transformed into enemy
aliens overnight. There were no trials, no hearings, to prove innocence or guilt They were
assumed to be the enemy. They were prisoners, indefinitely incarcerated, a political decision
based on race. They lost their homes and communities. Their families were separated.
They felt shame and guilt Their recent collective voices unfolding reach beneath this
surface of the Japanese American image of passive acceptance, "gamman" ("endurance"),
"shikata ga nai" ("it cannot be helped"), and survival. Their voices call out beyond anger
and memory.

In 1946, over 120,000 Japanese Americans were removed from their homes in the
"western defense zone" and incarcerated in ten camps in isolated areas of Utah, Montana,
Arkansas, Arizona, California, Colorado, and Idaho. These ten camps functioned as prison
cities, with populations of 10,000 to 18,000 people. Hundreds of barracks surrounded by
barbed wire. Every 500 yards was a guard tower and a guard. Almost fifty years later,
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Presidents Clinton and Reagan issued letters of apology to those still living who had been
interned in the camps.

As the French theorist Michel Foucault has noted in nineteenth century prison architectural
plan were often based on the panoptican, where one prison guard can see all of the prisoners
in their separate cells. Such a space exudes hierarchy and control These photographs of
the concentration camps are also about a mapping of space. Where the viewer can instantly
see a 360 degree panoramic view, which otherwise would circle around her. The viewer
becomes both prisoner and guard within the photograph's memory. The camera's eye
records a panoptic space that is also an impossible two-dimensional space, composed of
overlapping cubist images. From over 100 snapshots, these many sequential fragments
make-up one panoramic photo collage, extended and stretched like a multi-folded shoji
screen. They represent the gestalt of looking at many fractured images and seeing a unified
whole. These photographs contrast the beauty of the natural landscape with the memory
that it was the omnipresent backdrop, the daily "image" for thousands of innocent but
incarcerated Japanese Americans of the 1940's.

This installation is about the construction of that time and space, that "memory " of
transition and displacement.

t
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EXECUTIVE ORDER 9066
NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority
vested In me as President of the United States,
and Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy,
I hereby authorize and direct the Secretary of
War, and the Military Commanders whom he
may from time to time designate, whenever he
or any designated Commander deems such
action necessary or desirable, to prescribe
military areas in such places and of such extent
as he or the appropriate Military Commander
may determine, from which any or all persons
may be excluded, and with respect to which,
the right of any to enter, remain in, or leave
shall be subject to whatever restrictions the
Secretary of War or the appropriate Military
Commander may impose in his discretion....

FRANKUN D. ROOSEVELT
The White House
February 19, 1942

Source: Franklin D. Roosevelt,
White House. Executive Order 9066.
Washington, D. C. February 19, 1942.
f Internment of 110jOOO Japanese
Amertotg&^y M,ai?ie & Richard Conrat,
California
H^torical Society^CaUfornia,
? ? • - • -~'--. .-..., •->,-...;.»- -;-'-i*~ .'./.I-.- !.: . .• </
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Civilian Exclusion Order No. 5
WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL ADMINISTRATION
Presidio of San Francisco, California
April 1,1942

INSTRUCTIONS
TO ALL PERSONS OF

JAPANESE
ANCESTRY
LIVING IN THE FOLLOWING AREA:
All that portion of the City and County of San Francisco, State of
California, lying generally west of the north-south line established by
Junipero Serra Boulevard, Worchester Avenue, and Nineteenth Avenue, and lying generally north of the east-west line established by
California Street, to the intersection of Market Street, and thence on
Market Street to San Francisco Bay.
All Japanese persons, both alien and non-alien, will be evacuated
from the above designated area by 12:00 o'clock noon, Tuesday,
April 7, 1942.
No Japanese person will be permitted to enter or leave the above
described area after 8:00 a. m., Thursday, April 2, 1942, without
obtaining special permission from the Provost Marshal at the Civil
Control Station located at :
1701 Van Ness Avenue
San Francisco, California
The. Civil Control Station is equipped to assist the Japanese population affected by this evacuation in the following ways:
1. Give advice and instructions on the evacuation.
2. "Provide services with respect to the management, leasing, sale,
storage or other disposition of most kinds of property including: real
estate, business and professional equipment, buildings, household
goods, boats, automobiles, livestock, etc,
3. Provide temporary residence elsewhere for all Japanese in
family groups.
4. Transport persons and a limited amount of clothing and equipment to their new residence; as specified below.
A-6

THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS MUST BE OBSERVED :
1. A responsible member of each family, preferably the head of
the family, or the person in whose name most of the property is held,
and each individual living alone, vnll report to the Civil Control
Station to receive further instructions. This must be done between
8:00 a. m. and 5:00 p. m., Thursday, April 2, 1942, or between 8:00
a. m. and 5 :00 p. m,, Friday, April 3, 1942.
2. Evacuees must carry with them on departure for the Reception
Center, the following property:
(a) Bedding and linens (no mattress) for each member of the
family ;
(b) Toilet articles for each member of the family;
(c) Extra clothing for each member of the family;
(d) Sufficient knives, forks, spoons, plates, bowls and cups for each
member of the family;
(e) Essential personal effects for each member of the family.
All items carried will be securely packaged, tied and plainly
marked with the name of the owner and numbered in accordance
with instructions received at the Civil Control Station.

The size and number of packages is limited to that which can be
carried bythe individual or family group.
No contraband items as described in paragraph 6, Public Proclamation No. 3, Headquarters Western Defense Command and Fourth
Army, dated March 24, 1942, will be carried3. The United States Government through its agencies will provide
for the storage at the sole risk of the owner of the more substantial
household items, such as iceboxes, washing machines, pianos and other
heavy furniture. Cooking utensils and other small items will be accepted if crated, packed and plainly marked with the name and
address of the owner. Only one name and address will be used by a
given family.
4. Each family, and individual living alone, will be furnished
transportation to the Reception Center. Private means of transportation will not be utilized. All instructions pertaining to the movement
will be obtained at the Civil Control Station.
Co to the Civil Control Station at 1701 Van Ness Avenue, San
Francisco, California, between 8:00 a. m. and 5:00 p. m.,
Thursday, April 2, 1942, or between 8:00 a. m. and 5:00
p, m., Friday, April 3, 1942, to receive further instructions.

>.

Bee Civilian Exclusion Order No. 5

~»

;
J. L. DeWITT
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
'. • • Commanding

.""
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 1, 1993

Over fifty years ago, the United States
Government unjustly interned, evacuated, or
relocated you and many other Japanese Americans,
Today, on behalf of your fellow Americans, I
offer a sincere apology to you for the actions
that unfairly denied Japanese Americans and
their families fundamental liberties during
World War II.
^ In passing the Civil Liberties Act of
1988, we acknowledged the wrongs of the past
and offered redress to those who endured such
grave injustice. In retrospect, we understand
that the nation's actions were rooted deeply in
racial prejudice, wartime hysteria, and a lack
of political leadership. We must learn from
the past and dedicate ourselves as a nation to
renewing the spirit of equality and our love of
freedom. Together, we can guarantee a future
with liberty and justice for all. You and your
family have my best wishes for the future.

%
.

' A-8

GDLA RIVER RELOCATION CENTER
Final County, Arizona

GRANADA RELOCATION CENTER
Prowers County, Colorado

HEART MOUNTAIN RELOCATION CENTER
Park County, Wyoming

JEROME RELOCATION CENTER
Chicot County, Arkansas

MANZANAR RELOCATION CENTER
Inyo County, California

MINIDOKA RELOCATION CENTER
Jerome County, Idaho

POSTON RELOCATION CENTER
Yuma County, Arizona

ROHWER RELOCATION CENTER
Desha County, Arkansas

TOPAZ RELOCATION CENTER
Millard County, Utah

TULE LAKE RELOCATION CENTER
Klamath Falls, California
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Gila River
Gila River was the site of one of ten concentration camps which housed
Japanese Americans forcibly removed from the west coast states during World
War II.
Official name: Gila River Relocation Center.
Location: 45 miles southeast of Phoenix, in Final County, Arizona near
Sacaton; the Superstition Mountains loomed in the distance.
Land: Leased from the Pima Indian Reservation.
Size: 17,000 acres; the center was divided into two camps: Canal (209.5
acres) and Butte (789.25 acres).
Climate: Desert; Summer temperatures reached 125 degrees. The average
daily high temperatures for July, August, and September 1942 were 109.6,
104,0, and 99.7 degrees, respectively. Though not as bad as some other
camps, duststorms were also a problem here.
Camp population came from: Mostly from Los Angeles (4,952), Fresno
(1,972), Santa Barbara (1,797), San Joaquin (815), Solano (695), Contra Costa
and Ventura Counties (583).
Via "assembly centers": Most came via Turlock (3,566), Tulare (4,951), and
Santa Anita (1,294) "Assembly Centers"; nearly 3,000 came directly to Gila and
another 2,000 came from Jerome upon its closing.
Rural/Urban: Roughly equal split.
Peak population: 13,348.
Date of peak: December 30, 1942.
Opening date: July 20, 1942.
Closing date: Canal Camp: September 28, 1945.
Butte Camp: November 10, 1945.
Project directors): Lewis J. Kom, Eastbum Smith, Robert B. Cozzens, L. H.
Bennett, and Douglas M. Todd.
Community analysts: James H. Barnett and G. Gordon Brown.
Newspapers): Gila News Courier (September 12, 1942 September 5, 1945);
Gtia Bulletin (September 8 28, 1945).
% who answered question 28 of the loyalty questionnaire positively:

90.5.
Number and percentage of eligible citizen males inducted directly into
armed forces: 487 (5.0%).
[
Industry: A camouflage net factory operated from Fall 1942 to May 1943; a
model warship factory produced 800 models for the navy.
History: Gila River was on Indian Reservation land. The WRA director Milton
Eisenhower refused to relinquish administrative control of the camp to the
Office of Indian Affairs, probably because..of the potential for profitable
A-10

agricultural enterprise here. Much of the administrative staff at Gila came from
OIA personnel.
Gila had the most extensive agricultural program of all the camps. At its peak,
Gila farmed approximately 7,000 acres, 3,000 in vegetable crops, some of which
was shipped to other camps. Gila had 2,000 head of cattle, 2,500 3,000 head of
hogs, 25,000 chickens, and 110 dairy cows. Fields of stocks and marigolds were
also grown here for center consumption.
Gila saw four project directors in its first eight months; the fourth, L. H.
Bennett, remained in that position from December 12, 1942 to July 31, 1945.
The camp was marred by inadequate housing initially as people poured into a
center which was not yet complete. This necessitated housing people in every
conceivable space in the midst of near constant 100 degree temperatures until
construction could be completed. Schools opened in October 1942 despite the
almost total lack of supplies and furniture.
On November 30, 1942, Takeo Tada was beaten by a group of men. He had
been employed by both the Turlock "Assembly Center" and Gila administrations
and was targeted as an "inu" (dog) by those angry over a delay in clothing
allocations^and at the administration in general. Hearings resulted in a 30 day
jail sentence for the admitted perpetrator, amid a tense atmosphere where much
of the camp population supported the attacker.
Inadequate sanitation and sewage facilities coupled with the wind, dust, and
heat, led to outbreaks of diarrhea, tuberculosis, 'Valley Fever," and other less
serious disorders.
When Eleanor Roosevelt was to visit one of the camps in the Spring of 1943, Gila
was the one chosen, undoubtedly because it had the best appearance.

Source: Japanese American. History: An A to Z Reference, 1868 to the Present, by
JBrtanNiiya. New York: Facts on File. 1993.
Edited for exhibition by Masumi Hayashi, 1994.
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Granada
Granada was the site of one of ten concentration camps which housed Japanese
Americans forcibly removed from the West Coast states during World War II.
Official name: Granada Relocation Center.
Location: Prowers County, Colorado; located 14 miles east of Lamar and 20
miles west of the Kansas border in the Arkansas River Valley.
Land: Purchased from a private party.
Size: 10,500 acres.
Climate: Located on a hilltop at 3,500 foot elevation; arid and dusty, though
not as severe as the Arizona camps.
Camp population came from: Mostly from Los Angeles (3,181), Sonoma (696),
Yolo (666), Stanislaus (661), Sacramento (632), and Merced (449) Counties.
Via "assembly centers": Most came from Merced (4,500) and Santa Anita
(3,063) "Assembly Centers".
Rural/Urban: Roughly equal split.
Peak population: 7,318; Granada was the least populous of the camps.
Date of peak: February 1. 1943.
Opening date: August 27, 1942.
Closing date: October 15, 1945.
Project directors): James G. Lindley.
Community analysts: E. Adamson Hoebel, John Ralph McFarling, John A.
Rademaker.
Newspapers): Granada Bulletin (October 14 24, 1942); Granada Pioneer
(October 28, 1942 September 15, 1945).
% who answered question 28 of the loyalty questionnaire positively: 99.8;
Granada had the highest "Yes" percentage of all camps.
Number and percentage of eligible citizen males inducted directly into
armed forces: 494 (9.9%); Granada had the highest percentage of eligible
males inducted into the armed forces.
Industry: Granada had a silk screen poster shop that produced a quarter of a
million posters for naval training.
History: Though located in a farming area, the agricultural development of the
camp was unimpressive. Granada was at one point plagued by a polio problem
that caused the administration to cancel some activities and to stop issuing
passes to the outside.
'

Source: Japanese American History: An A to Z Reference, 1868 to the Present,
by Brian Niiya. New York: Facts on File, 1993.
I
:
Edited for exhibition by Masumi;Hayashj,?-1995.
V
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Heart Mountain
Heart Mountain was the site of one of ten concentration camps which housed
Japanese Americans forcibly removed from the West Coast states during World
War II.
Official name: Heart Mountain Relocation Center.
Location: Northwestern Wyoming, in Park County, 13 miles northeast of Cody.
Land: Federal reclamation project land.
Size: 46,000 acres.
Climate: Severe, even by WRA standards, with winter lows dipping to 30
degrees. Elevation: 4,600 feet.
Camp population came from: Mostly from Los Angeles (6,448), Santa Clara
(2,572), San Francisco (678) and Yakima, Washington (843) Counties.
Via "assembly centers": Most came from Pomona (5,270) and Santa Anita
(4,700) "Assembly Centers".
Rural/Urban: Mostly urban.
Peak population: 10,767.
Date of peak: January 1, 1943.
Opening date: August 12, 1942.
Closing date: November 10, 1945.
Project directors): Christopher E. Rachford and Guy Robertson.
Community analysts: Asael T. Hansen and Forrest La Violette.
Newspaper: Heart Mountain Sentinel (October 24, 1942 July 28, 1945).
% who answered question 28 of the loyalty questionnaire positively: 95.9.
Number and percentage of eligible male citizens inducted directly into
armed forces: 385 (4.8%).
Industry: Heart Mountain had a garment factory, a cabinet shop and a sawmill
that produced goods for internal consumption. A silk screen shop produced
posters for the other camps and for the navy.
History: The weather, along with the shoddy construction of the barracks and
a population mostly from Southern California unaccustomed to the cold,
contributed to a great many illnesses that resulted in hospital overcrowding in
the winter of 1942 43. In addition to the severe climate, Heart Mountain, like
many other camps, was also plagued by duststorms and rattlesnakes.
Despite the inhospitability of the area, Heart Mountain was to become one of the
most successful camps in terms of agriculture; many crops that had never been
grown in the area before were introduced.
Heart Mountain residents were stung by a series of muckraking articles about
the camp by K£ten.uer Post reporter Jack Carberry. alleging, among many other
tilings, that the inmate populatiop was being "coddled."

§
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Heart Mountain was also the site of the only organized resistance to the military
draft. Beginning in February 1944, the FPC organized in HEART MOUNTAIN
around the issue of drafting NISEI from the concentration camps for military
service. Citing the Constitution, the members of the FPC stated that they would
not report to the draft board if called upon until their rights as citizens were
restored.
See the entry for GILA RIVER.
There are a number of works specifically on Heart Mountain. For a general
history of the camp, see Douglas W. Nelson, Heart Mountain: The History of an
American Concentration Camp. Madison, Wis.: The State Historical Society of
Wisconsin, 1976. Rita Takahashi Gates, "Comparative Administration and
Management of Five War Relocation Authority Camps: America's Incarceration
of Persons of Japanese Descent during World War II." -Diss,, University of
^Pittsburgh, 1980 studies the administrative strategies of Heart Mountain and
four other camps. Asael T. Hansen. "My Two Years at Heart Mountain: The
Difficult Role of an Applied Anthropologist." In Daniels, Roger, Sandra C. Taylor,
and Harry H. L. Kitano, eds. ^Japanese Americans: From Relocation to Redress.
Revised Edition. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1991. 33 37 is a
reminiscence by the former "community analyst" at Heart Mountain, lauren^
Kessler. v!Tettered Freedoms: The Journalism of World War II Japanese /
Internment Camps/ Journalism History 15.2 3 (Summer/Autumn 1988): 60
69 is a study of journalism in the camps which focuses much attention on the
Heart Mountain Sentinel Estelle Peck Ishigo. Lone Heart Mountain. Los
Angeles: Anderson. Ritchie & Simon, 1972 and Gretel Ehrlich., Heart Mountain.
New York: Viking. 1988. Source: Japanese American History: An A to Z Reference, 1868 to the Present,
by Brian Niiya. New York: Facts on File, 1993.
Edited for exhibition by Masumi Hayashi, 1995.

f
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Jerome
Jerome was the site of one of ten concentration camps which housed Japanese
Americans forcibly removed from the West Coast states during World War II.
Official name: Jerome Relocation Center.
Location: Drew and Chicot Counties, southeastern Arkansas.
Land: Farm Security Administration land.
Size: 10,000 acres.
Climate: Swamp land; green and tropical; humid.
Camp population came from: Mostly from Los Angeles (3,147), Fresno
(2,013), Sacramento (993), and Honolulu (445) Counties.
Via "assembly centers": Most came from Fresno (4,743) and Santa Anita
(2,931) "assembly centers"; another 811 came from Hawaii.
Rural/Urban: Roughly equal split.
Peak population: 8.497.
Date of peak: February 11, 1943.
Opening date: October 6, 1942.
Closing date: June 30, 1944; Jerome was in operation only 634 days, the
shortest of any camp.
Project directors): Paul Taylor and W. O. "Doc" Melton.
Community analysts: Edgar C. McVoy and Rachel R. Sady.
Newspapers): Communique (October 23, 1942 February 26, 1943); Denson
Tribune (March 2, 1943 June 6, 1944).
Percent who answered question 28 of the loyalty questionnaire positively:
75.0; Jerome had the highest percentage of persons answering negatively, giving
a qualified answer or refusing to answer.
Number and percentage of eligible male citizens inducted directly into
armed forces: 52 (0.9%); Jerome had the lowest percentage of eligible male
citizens inducted into the armed forces besides Tule Lake.
Industry : Jerome had a sawmill that produced goods for internal
consumption.
History: There were no guard towers at Jerome and the fences were low; this
was because the camp was surrounded by swamps inhabited by four species of
the most deadly snakes in America. Farming here was difficult, but the
completion in November 1942 of a canal that drained off excess water resulted
in some agricultural success.
'
See the entry for GILA RIVER.
General histories of Jerome include Russell Bearden. "Hie False Rumor of
Tuesday: Arkansas's Internmen^of Japaftese Americans." Arkansas Historical
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Quarterly 41.4 (1982): 327 39 and "life Inside Arkansas's Japanese American
Relocation Centers." Arkansas Historical Quarterly 68 (Summer 1989): 169
96. Carole Katsuko Yumiba. "An Educational History of the War Relocation
Centers at Jerome and Rohwer, Arkansas, 1942 1945" Diss., University of
Southern California, 1979.
Source: Japanese American History: An AtoZ Reference, 1868 to the Present,
by Brian Niiya. New York: Facts on File, 1993.
Edited for exhibition by Masumi Hayashi, 1995.
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Manzanar
Manzanar was the site of one of ten concentration camps which housed
Japanese Americans forcibly removed from the west coast states during World
War II.
Official name: Manzanar Relocation Center.
Location: Inyo County, California in the Owens Valley, 225 miles north of Los
Angeles.
Land: Land controlled by the City of Los Angeles for its municipal water
supply.
Size: 6,000 acres.
Climate: Desert, extreme Winters and Summers. Mt. Whitney and Mt.
Williamson could be seen in the distance making it one of the most beautiful of
camp sites.
Camp population came from: Mostly from Los Angeles County (8,828).
Via "assembly centers": Manzanar began as an "Assembly Center".
Rural/Urban: Overwhelmingly urban.
Peak population: 10,046.
Date of peak: September 22, 1942.
Opening date: June 1, 1942; Manzanar began as a Wartime Civil Control
Administration administered "assembly center" and opened on March 22, 1942;
it came under War Relocation Authority jurisdiction on June 1.
Closing date: November 21, 1945.
Project directors): Roy Nash, Harvey N. Coverley, Solon T. Kimball, and Ralph
P. Merritt.
Community analysts: John de Young and Morris E. Opler.
Newspaper: Manzanar Free Press (April 11, 1942 September 8, 1945); the
paper started while Manzanar was an "assembly center" and continued to
publish through its transfer to WRA jurisdiction.
% who answered question 28 of the loyalty questionnaire positively: 86.9:
Number and percentage of eligible citizen males inducted directly into
armed forces: 174 (2.5%).
Industry: Manzanar had a camouflage net factory which operated from June to
December 1942; also a garment factory, a cabinet shop, and a mattress factory
which produced goods for internal consumption.
History: Manzanar was probably the most closely guarded of all the camps,
due in part to its origin as a WCCA camp, to^its location within the Western
Defense Command's restricted zone, and the extreme hostility of the local
population.
Counting its WCCA director (Clayton Triggs), :Manzanar had five
directors/managers in its first eight months.' Merritt took over as director on
November 19, 1942 and remaine^ in this~3pQSition until the camp's closing.
V
. - * • • • •
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Manzanar was a relatively turbulent center; the Monzonor Incident of December
1942 exposed deep rifts in the population.
For further reading: Photographic studies of Manzanar include Ansel Adams.
Born Free and Equal: Photographs of the Loyal. Japanese Americans of Manzanar
Relocation Center, Inyo County, California. New York: U.S. Camera, 1944;
Ansel Adams and Toyo Miyatake. Two Views of Manzanar: An Exhibition of
Photographs. Los Angeles: Frederick S. Wight Art Gallery, University of
California, Los Angeles, 1978;' and John Armor and Peter Wight. Manzanar. f
Photographs by Ansel Adams. Commentary by John Hersey. New York: Times
Books, 1988.

Source: Japanese American History: An AtoZ Reference, 1868 to the Present, by
Brian Niiya. New York: Facts on File, 1993.
Edited for exhibition by Masumi Hayashi, 1994.
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Minidoka
Minidoka was the site of one of ten concentration camps which housed Japanese
Americans forcibly removed from the west coast states during World War II.
Official name: Minidoka Relocation Center.
Location: Jerome County, south central Idaho, 6 miles north of Eden.
Land: Federal reclamation project land, part of the Gooding Reclamation
District.
Size: 33,500 acres.
Climate: Severe; plagued by dust storms.
Camp population came from: King, WA (6,098), Multnomah, OR (1,927),
Pierce, WA( 1,051).
Via "assembly centers": Most came from Puyallup (7,150) and Portland
(2,318) "Assembly Centers".
Rural/Urban: Mostly urban.
Peak population: 9,397.
Date of peak: March 1, 1943.
Opening date: August 10, 1942.
Closing date: October 28, 1945.
Project directors): Harry Stafford.
Community analysts: Gordon Armbruster, John de Young, and Elmer R.
Smith.
Newspaper: Minidoka Irrigator (September 10, 1942 July 28, 1945).
% who answered question 28 of the loyalty questionnaire positively: 98.7.
Number and percentage of eligible citizen males inducted directly into
armed forces: 594 (8.8%).
Industry: Minidoka had a garment factory which produced goods for internal
consumption.
History: Minidoka was regarded by many as the "best" of the camps whose
positive atmosphere stemmed from the relatively homogeneous population and
the relatively benevolent administration. Because it was not in the Western
Defense Command restricted area, its security was lighter than that of other
camps.
Source: Japanese American History: An A to Z Reference, 1868 to the Present,
by Brian Niiya. New York: Facts ;on File, 1993.
Edited for exhibition by Masumi Hayashi, 1994.
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Poston
Poston was the site of one of ten concentration camps which housed Japanese
Americans forcibly removed from the West Coast states during World War II.
One of two camps located in the Arizona desert, Poston was located on an Indian
reservation and was the only camp to be administered by the Office of Indian
Affairs (OIA) (until the end of 1943) rather than the WAR RELOCATION
AUTHORITY (WRA).
Official name: Colorado River Relocation Center.
Location: Yuma County, Arizona, 17 miles south of Parker.
Land: On the Colorado Indian Reservation.
Size: 71,000 acres; Poston was the largest of the camps.
Climate: Desert; perhaps the hottest of all camps.
Camp population came from: Mostly from Los Angeles (2,750), Tulare (1,952),
San Diego (1,883), Orange (1,636), Fresno (1,590), Imperial (1,512), Monterey
(1,506), and Santa Cruz (1,222) Counties.
Via "assembly centers": Most either came to Poston directly (11,738) or came
from Salinas (3,459) or Santa Anita (1,573) "ASSEMBLY CENTERS"; Poston also
received 469 transfers from Justice Department administered INTERNMENT
CAMPS, the highest figure of any WRA camp.
Rural/Urban: Mostly rural.
Peak population: 17,814, the most populous besides TULE LAKE
"SEGREGATION CENTER".

Date of peak: September 2, 1942.
Opening date: May 8, 1942.
Closing date: Unit I: November 28, 1945
Unit II: September 29, 1945
Unit III: September 29, 1945.
Project director(s): Wade Head and Duncan Mills.
Community analysts: Alexander Leighton, Edward H. Spicer, Elizabeth Colson
and David H. French; Conrad Arensberg and Laura Thompson were consultants.
Newspaper: Poston Chronicle (May 13, 1942 October 23, 1945).
Percent who answered question 28 of the loyalty questionnaire positively:
93.7.
Number and percentage of eligible male citizens inducted directly into
armed forces: 611 (4.8 percent).
Industry: A camouflage net factory operated from fall 1942 to May 1943.
History: The most notable incident at Poston was the POSTON STRIKE,
described in detail in the following entry. There was another strike involving 57
adobe workers in August 1942 that was quickly settled. Poston was named after
Charles Poston, the "Father of Arizona." One of the most intensively studied of
all the camps, Poston housed a jjiocial science laboratory under the leadership of
Alexander Leighton while undeiphe QIA"ta,addition to having WRA community
>*
;
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analysts and JAPANESE AMERICAN EVACUATION AND RESETTLEMENT
STUDY fieldworkers.
Tensions between the OIA and the WRA led to the latter taking over
administration of Poston at the beginning of 1944. The OIA had ideas of starting
large scale farming ventures with the Japanese Americans on a semi permanent
basis; this conflicted with the WRA's strategy of encouraging "loyal" residents to
leave for RESETTLEMENT as soon as possible.
See the entry for GILA RIVER.
POSTON STRIKE: The strike was the manifestation of long standing tensions in
the community exacerbated by the camp environment. By WAR RELOCATION
AUTHORITY decree, only NISEI were allowed to hold elective office, and the
Community Council at Poston consisted entirely of young nisei. They quickly
succeeded in alienating the administration by being too inquisitive and in
upsetting the residents who distrusted their JAPANESE AMERICAN CITIZENS
LEAGUE orientation and their inexperience. They were seen by many as
"administration stooges" or as a "child council." To try to bring ISSEI into the
decision making process, the Issei Advisory Board was formed in August, but the
utter lack of power granted this group only increased tensions. Competition
between the Community Council and this advisory council ensued and people
seen as "INU" were physically attacked.
On November 14, 1942, one such inmate was beaten severely with a piece of
pipe. Quickly, 50 suspects were arrested and two were held for further
questioning. Both were quite popular among camp residents. When it became
known that these men were to be tried in an Arizona court on the outside (it was
widely perceived that no Japanese could get a fair trial outside camp), protest
erupted. An issei delegation visited the project director on November 17 to
request the suspects' release. They were refused. After a second unsuccessful
meeting the following day, a general strike ensued. The Community Council
resigned as a body in support of the strike and in fear, and crowds began to
gather around the jail holding the two suspects. In the meantime, the project
director had left to attend a meeting, leaving the camp in charge of an assistant.
With the beginning of the strike, some in the administration urged him to call in
the army and to impose martial law; he chose the negotiation route. Meanwhile,
over the next few days, all services except the police, fire department and
hospital were closed down. Strike leaders stood around bonfires, played
Japanese militaristic music and extolled the emperor. Eventually, the
administration made concessions, agreeing.on November 23 to release one
prisoner outright and to try the qther within the center. Meanwhile, after 10
days, the strike began to erode as many_nisei tired of it. The issei leaders were
recognized by the administration and agreed to try to help stop the beatings and
• A-21

to establish better rapport between administration and internees.
Source: Japanese American History: An A to Z Reference, 1868 to the Present,
by Brian Niiya. New York: Facts on File, 1993.
Edited for exhibition by Masumi Hayashi, 1995.
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Rohwer
Rohwer was the site of one of ten concentration camps which housed Japanese
Americans forcibly removed from the West Coast states during World War II.
Official name: Rohwer Relocation Center.
Location: Desha County, southeastern Arkansas.
Land: Farm Security Administration land.
Size: 10,161 acres.
Climate: Wooded swamp land; high heat and humidity, with sudden rains.
Camp population came from: Mostly from Los Angeles (4,324) and San
Joaquin (3.516) Counties.
Via "assembly centers:": Most came from Santa Anita (4,415) or Stockton
(3,802) "ASSEMBLY CENTERS"; Rohwer also received the highest number of
transfers from Jerome (2,734) upon that camp's closing.
Rural/Urban: Mostly urban.
Peak population: 8,475.
Date of peak: March 11, 1943.
Opening date: September 18, 1942.
Closing date: November 30, 1945.
Project directors): Raymond Johnson.
Community analysts: Margaret Lantis, Katherine Luomala and Charles
Wisdom.
Newspaper. Rohwer Outpost (October 24, 1942 July 21, 1945); Rohwer
Relocalor (August 1 November 9, 1945).
% who answered question 28 of the loyalty questionnaire positively: 94.9.
Number and percentage of eligible male citizens inducted directly into
armed forces: 274 (4.7 percent).
History: In an early episode, inmate volunteers clearing brush were marched
off to jail at gunpoint by locals who thought they were Japanese paratroopers.
Because of the irregular weather, farming was difficult here despite relatively
fertile soil. The climate also led to problems with mosquitos and chiggers.
See the entrv for GILA RIVER.
Arkansas Historical Quarterly 68KSummer 1989): 16996. Carole Katsuko
Yumiba. "An Educational History of the War' Relocation Centers at Jerome and
Rohwer, Arkansas, 1942 1945."
Source: Japanese American History: An A to Z Reference, 1868 to the Present
by Brian Niiya. New York: Facts on File, 1993.
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Topaz
Topaz was the site of one of ten concentration camps which housed Japanese
Americans forcibly removed from the West Coast states during World War II.
Official name: Central Utah Relocation Center.
Location: Millard County, Utah, near Abraham, 140 miles south of Salt Lake
City.
Land: Mix of public domain land, land which had reverted to the county for non
payment of taxes and land purchased from private parties.
Size: 19,800 acres.
Climate: Temperatures ranged from 106 degrees in summer to -30 degrees in
winter; located at an elevation of 4,600 feet, the region was subject to a constant
wind that resulted in frequent dust storms.
Camp population came from: Mostly from Alameda (3,679), San Francisco
(3,370). and San Mateo (722) Counties.
Via "assembly centers": Nearly all (7,676) came from Tanforan "Assembly
Center".
Rural/Urban: Overwhelmingly urban.
Peak population: 8,130.
Date of peak: March 17, 1943.
OpeningoVate: September 11, 1942.
Closing date: October 31, 1945.
Project director(s): Charles F. Ernst (9/42 to 6/44) and Luther T. Hoffman
(6/44 to 10/45).
Community analysts: Oscar F. Hoffman and Weston LaBarre.
Newspaper: Topaz Times (September 17, 1942 August 31, 1945).
% who answered question 28 of the loyalty questionnaire positively: 89.4.
Number and percentage of eligible male citizens inducted directly into
armed forces: 472 (7.3 percent).
History: Topaz featured an organized protest against the registration
questionnaire, in which a petition was circulated demanding the restoration of
rights as a prerequisite for registration. ISSEI chef JAMES HATSUKIWAKASA
was shot to death by a guard on April 11, 1943. The literary and arts magazine
Trek was produced here.
See the entry for GILA RIVER.
Source: Japanese American History: An A to Z Reference, 1868 to the Present,
by Brian Niiya. New York: Facts on File, 1993.
Edited for exhibition by Masumi"Hayashi, 1995.
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Tule Lake Relocation Center and Segregation Center
Tule Lake was the site of one of ten concentration camps which housed Japanese
Americans forcibly removed from the west coast states during World War II. In
1943, Tule Lake was selected as the "Segregation Center" after the Loyalty Oath
questionnaire identified dissidents, and a decision was made to isolate these
internees.
Official name: Tule Lake Relocation Center.
Location: Klamath Falls Basin in Northern California, just south of the Oregon
border. The closest town was Newell, Calif. Tule Lake is located just across the
road from Lava Beds National Monument and the site of the Modoc war of 1872
73.
Land: Federal reclamation project land.
Size: 26,000 acres.
Climate: Relatively mild, for a WRA camp site; the land was a dry lake bed
covered with sagebrush 4,000 feet above sea level.
Camp population came from: Mostly from Sacramento (4,984), King, WA
(2,703), Placer (1,807), Pierce, WA (946), Yuba (476), and Hood River, OR (425)
Counties.
Via "assembly centers": Most came via Sacramento (4,671), Pinedale (4,011),
or Marysville (2,455) "Assembly Centers"; another 3,166 came directly to Tule
Lake.
Rural/Urban: Roughly equal split.
Peak population: 18,789; peak population occurred after Tule Lake and
become a "Segregation Center".
Date of peak: December 25, 1944.
Opening date: May 27, 1942.
Closing date: March 20, 1946; Tule Lake closed as a "Segregation Center".
Project director(s): Elmer Shirrell, Harvey Coverly, and Raymond Best.
Community analysts: Marvin K. Opler.
Newspaper: Tulean Dispatch (June 15, 1942 October 30, 1943).
% who answered question 28 of the loyalty questionnaire positively: 84.4.
Number and percentage of eligibile citizen males inducted directly into
armed forces: 57 (0.5%); Tule Lake had the lowest percentage of eligible citizen
male inducted into the armed forces.
Industry: Tule Lake had a cabinet shop and a bakery which produced goods for
internal consumption.
t

History:
Tule Lake Relocation Center, 1942 1943. Tule Lake was beset by much unrest.
A farm laborers strike occurred on August 15, 1942 over the lack of promised
goods and salaries. Packing shed workers struck in September, while a mess
hall workers protest took place in October 1942. This culminated with large
numbers of people refusing to register for the draft.
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With the decision to segregate the "loyal" from the "disloyal" on the basis of the
1943 loyalty questionnaire, Tule Lake was chosen as the camp where the
"disloyals" would be isolated. Tule Lake became "Tule Lake Segregation Center"
in the fall of 1943.
Tule Lake Segregation Center, 1943 - 1946.
Tule Lake "Segregation Center" was created following disturbances associated
with loyalty questionnaires administered by the War Department and WRA
during February and March, 1943. The negative responses by many Japanese
Americans to the loyalty questions were in reality protests against their removal
and incarceration. The WRA was pressured from Congress, the Army, the
Japanese American Citizens League, and its own project directors, to isolate the
"disloyal" in a separate center.
On July 15, 1943, the WRA announced that the following would be sent to Tule
Lake Segregation Center: aliens and American citizens of Japanese descent who
had appllied for repatriation or expatriation to Japan (7,222 persons); those who
had answered the loyalty questions in the negative, or had refused to answer
(4,785 persons); those who had been denied clearance to leave the centers; and
paroled aliens from Department of Justice interment camps who were
recommended for detention. The WRA also included all persons in their centers
it believed to be anti administration or "troublemakers," as well as their family
members^ BrOOO original residents of Tule Lake Relocation Center chose to
remain in the camp rather than undergo another forced move. The move to Tule
Lake took place during September and October, 1943.
A newly erected heavy wire mesh "man proof fence held them inside, while
elevated block houses and watch towers with armed sentries prevented escape.
Outside the fence, a battalion of military police with armored cars and tanks
stood in full view of the residents. Permission to resettle was denied for all
regardless of loyalty status. Self government, as established in other centers,
was not allowed, although an advisory council to the administration was formed.
In October 1943, project director Raymond Best refused to negotiate with the
internee community organization (the Daihyo Sha Kai) and its Negotiating
Committee. A meeting followed in which national director Dillon Myer and other
administers were surrounded by thousands of peaceful residents/internees who
came to support their representatives.
The U.S. Army entered Tule Lake segregation camp on November 4, 1943, and
martial law was declared nine days later. The; center was not returned to civilian
control until January 15, 1944. A curfew kept people indoors, and ended
recreational activities. The Army arrested anyone suspected of being anti
administration without hearings or trials. A stockade was constructed.
Of the 18,422 persons isolated in the center, more than one fourth, including
4,517 citizens, were classified as l&yal. Many of those classified as "disloyal"
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Appendix C
Timeline of Selected Events Related to the Japanese American Evacuation and
Internment
1941
December 7

Naval air forces of the Empire of Japan attack United States
installations on the U.S. territory of the Hawaiian Islands.
FDR proclaims a state of war exists.

December 8

Congress votes for war. FDR issues orders classifying
nationals of belligerent countries as enemy aliens. The
Attorney General is given authority to establish prohibited
zones, seize weapons or other articles, freeze enemy aliens'
funds and to intern any who may be a threat to national
security.
False report of Japanese aircraft over San Francisco.
Hundreds of similar reports follow.

December 7- 9

The Justice Department arrests 857 Germans, 147
Italians and 1,291 Japanese. All arrests were based on
information that had been compiled by the FBI and
military intelligence services prior to the attack on Pearl
Harbor.

December 11

Western Defense Command established, with Lieutenant
General John L. DeWitt as Commander.

December 13

Japanese military forces capture Guam.

December 15

The governor of California declares a state of emergency.
He also asks that tolerance be accorded American
citizens of foreign decent and especially JapaneseAmericans.

December 22

The Agriculture Committee of the L.A. Chamber of
Commerce recommended that all Japanese
nationals be put under "absolute Federal control."

December 24

Japanese military forces capture Wake Island

December 25

Japanese military forces capture Hong Kong
1

(1941 Continued)
December 27

Japanese military forces capture Manila. United States
forces retreat to Bataan.

December 29

Enemy aliens in California, Oregon, Washington,
Montana, Idaho, Utah, and Nevada ordered to
surrender contraband.
1942

January 1

First violence against Japanese - Americans. Kazuo
Ouchida and Matsuo Matsumots wounded by gunfire in
Gilroy, California.

January 5

Japanese American selective service registrants classified
as enemy aliens (IV-C). Many Japanese American soldiers
discharged or assigned to menial labor.

January 6

"I do not believe that we could be any too strict in our
consideration of the Japanese in the face of the
treacherous way in which they do things," wrote Leland
Ford, L.A. Congressman, in a telegram to Secretary of
State Cordell Hull, asking that all Japanese Americans be
removed from the West Coast.

January 17

California State Senate passes a bill preventing the hiring
of any additional persons of Japanese descent for civil
service jobs.

January 27

City of Los Angeles and Los Angeles County fire all
employees of Japanese descent

January 28

The California State Personnel Board voted to bar all
"descendants of natives with whom the United States [is]
at war" from all civil service positions. This was only
enforced against Japanese Americans.

January 29

The Attorney General issues an order designating
"prohibited areas," from which all enemy aliens, German,
Italian and Japanese were to be evacuated by the 24th of
February. About 10,000 people were affected, but most
only moved a short distance away from certain factories,
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harbors or military installations. This order is implemented
by the Justice Department, not the Army.
January 30

"Unless something is done it may bring about a repetition
of Pearl Harbor," said Earl Warren, California Attorney
General, calling Japanese Californians the "Achilles heel of
the entire civilian defense effort."

February 2

Three hundred thirty-six aliens living on Terminal Island,
near the San Pedro naval base, are arrested on
Presidential warrants.

February 4

Attorney General of the United States Francis Biddle
announces that the coast of California from the Oregon
border to a point fifty miles north of Los Angeles and
extending inland from thirty to one hundred fifty miles had
been declared a "restricted area" for enemy aliens. Eleven
other areas around Hydroelectric plants in the state were
also restricted.

February 6

A Portland Oregon American Legion post urged the removal
of "enemy aliens, especially from critical coast areas,"
including Japanese American citizens.

February 12

Attorney General Biddle sends a letter to Secretary of
War Stimson with the following recommendation.
No legal problem arises where Japanese citizens are
evacuated; but American Citizens of Japanese origin
could not, in my opinion, be singled out of an area
and evacuated with the other Japanese. However,
the result
might be accomplished by evacuating
all persons in the area and then licensing back those
whom the military authorities thought were not
objectionable from a military point of view.... Let me
add again that the Department of Justice, and
particularly the Federal Bureau of investigation, is not
staffed to undertake any evacuation on a large scale.
... the Army is the only organization which can
arrange the evacuations.
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February 13

A delegation of West Coast Congressmen (strongly
influenced by special interest groups and newspapers)
recommends to President Roosevelt that all persons of
Japanese descent be removed from the Pacific Coast.

February 16

California Joint Immigration Committee urged that all
Japanese Americans be removed from the Pacific Coast
and any other vital areas. 2192 Japanese Americans
are under arrest by the FBI.

February 17

California State Board of Equalization suspends 13
Japanese Americans from its roll of employees.

February 19

FDR signs Executive Order 9066, "Authorizing the
Secretary of War to Prescribe Military Areas ... from which
... persons may be excluded."

February 20

Secretary of War Stimson delegates the powers given to
him by the President and appoints General DeWitt as
"the Military Commander to carry out the duties and
responsibilities" under Executive Order 9066. Exact
nature of his duties is unclear. There is no agreement as
to how many or what kind of persons are to be
evacuated. Stimson does specify that persons of Italian
descent should not be removed. (The Mayor of San
Francisco was Italian, so were baseball heroes Joe and
Dom DiMaggio; Italians were favorably regarded by the
American public.) In subsequent memos, Stimson
indicates that German enemy aliens should be examined
on a case by case basis. (The average age of German
enemy aliens was determined to be about 70 years and
those considered dangerous had been watched by the FBI
and already arrested.)

February 21

Select House Committee on National Defense Migration
(the Tolan Committee) holds its first public hearing in San
Francisco. Other hearings will be held in Portland,
Seattle and Los Angeles.

February 23

A Japanese submarine, 1-17, fires thirteen cannon shells
at oil storage tanks on a hillside north of Santa Barbara.
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February 24

The "Battle of Los Angeles." U.S. Army personnel detect
(nonexistent) enemy airplanes over Los Angeles. A total of
1,400 anti-aircraft shells are fired over the city. Shell
fragments fall onto city streets, damaging cars but
causing no serious injuries.

February 26

Tolan Committee sends a telegram to 15 Governors of
Western States soliciting their response to the proposal
to relocate all aliens, German, Italian, and Japanese (of
whatever citizenship) east of the Pacific Coast State
boundaries. The Governors responses were generally
negative citing security problems and competition with
local labor. Nebraska was willing to accept them if they
were well guarded. Only the Governor of Colorado
openly invited them into his state.

February 27

The Cabinet meets in Washington to discuss evacuation
of enemy aliens. The decision is made that the Army
would only be responsible for rounding up enemy aliens.
A new civilian agency called the War Relocation Authority
would manage the actual resettlement.

February 28

House Committee on Un-American Activities released its
300 page Yellow Book, containing multiple charges against
Japanese Americans.

February 29

Public Proclamation Number One begins voluntary
relocation.

March 2

Secretary of War increases the authority of the
Commanding General, Western Defense Command. This
action is intended to facilitate preparations for the defense
of coastal areas against invasion.
Military Area Number One, as identified in Public
Proclamation Number One, prescribes an area from 50 to
150 miles wide in California, Oregon, and Washington and
Southern Arizona. All persons of Japanese descent were to
be excluded from this area.

(1942 Continued)
Military Area Number Two was established immediately
East of Area Number One, but no directions for
evacuation were given.
March 12

Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco announces that it
is contracted to take over duties in connection with
evacuee property matters and would provide assistance,
the Assistant to the US Secretary would take on the
responsibility of conservation of evacuee property. Soon
after, the Farm Security Administration was given the task
of conservation of agricultural property.

March 15

General Order Number 34 creates the Civil Affairs Division
of the Western Defense Command to carry out the
evacuation

March 16

DeWitt issued Public Proclamation No. 2, creating Military
Areas 3 to 6 in Idaho, Montana, Nevada, and Utah,
respectively.

March 18

President Roosevelt signs Executive Order 9102, which
set up the War Relocation Authority within the Office of
Emergency Management. Milton S. Eisenhower is
appointed Director.

March 19

Colonel Karl Bendetsen, Assistant Chief of Staff for
Western Defense Command and Director of the Wartime
Civil Control Administration operations, announces that
the Army would no longer be responsible for evacuees
following their removal from the military areas.

March 20

Western Defense Command announces that it has taken
over the Santa Anita Race Track for use as an "induction
Center." Soon, the term "induction center" would change
to "assembly center."

March 21

First Evacuation Order issued. One thousand Japanese
Americans voluntarily moved from Los Angeles to a
center at Manzanar in Owens Valley, California.
Congress passes legislation which would subject any
civilian who disobeyed a military order to prison and a fine.
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Republican conservative Senator Robert A. Taft was the
only member of congress to challenge the bill, calling it
"the sloppiest criminal law I have ever read or seen
anywhere." Public Law 503 passes unanimously.
March 23

The Western Defense Command issues Civilian Exclusion
Order No. 1 stating that all Japanese Americans living on
Bainbridge Island (near Bremerton Navy Yard, Seattle) must
evacuate by March 30.

March 26

Western Defense Command announces that eight new
assembly centers would be opened at Marysville,
Sacramento, Turlock, Merced, Fresno, Tulare, Stockton,
and Pinedale.

March 27

Public Proclamation No. 4 forbids ethnic Japanese from
changing their residence without Army permission
and ends voluntary relocation after March 29 in Military
Area Number One. Public Proclamation Number Six
would stop voluntary relocation from Military Area Number
Two on June 2, 1942.

March 28

The Portland, Oregon curfew violated by Minoru Yasui.

March 29

Exclusion Order No. One (Issued March 24, 1942)
becomes effective. First controlled compulsory relocation
executed.

April 7

WRA Director Milton Eisenhower meet with representatives
from 10 western states. Most present oppose unsupervised
migration.

May 6

Lt. General Wainwright surrenders U.S. forces on
Corregidor.

May 8

First group of evacuees arrive at the Poston Relocation
Center.

May 16

Seattle's curfew and exclusion restrictions violated by
Gordon Hirabayashi.
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May 30

Fred Korematsu arrested in San Leandro, California for
exclusion violation.

June 7

General DeWitt announced completion of the removal of
100,000 Japanese Americans from Military Area No. 1.

June 12

Fred T. Korematsu was charged with violation of Exclusion
Order No. 34 in U.S. District Court for Northern California.

June 17

Dillon S. Myer replaced Milton Eisenhower as WRA Director.

June 29

1600 evacuees sent to fill sugar beet labor shortage in
Oregon, Utah, Idaho, and Montana.

July 13

Mitsuye Endo filed for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

August 7

Phase one of the evacuation completed. Forced removal of
110,000 Japanese Americans from their homes had been
accomplished.

October 12

Roosevelt declared Italian aliens were no longer considered
"enemy aliens."

October 19

Public Proclamation No. 13 ends curfew and travel
restrictions for Italian citizens.

October 20

Trial of Gordon K. Hirabayashi started in Seattle with Judge
Lloyd L. Black.

October 24

Over 8000 evacuees were working to save the beet and
potato crop harvest in various western states.

November 3

Phase two of the evacuation completed. All evacuees
previously confined in Army Assembly Centers had been
transferred to War Relocation Authority Relocation Centers.

November 14

Evacuees at Gila River stage a demonstration and strike
protesting the arrest of two residents accused of assault.

November 18

Poston 1 protest of arrest of two evacuees accused of
assault begins.
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November 23

Agreement reached between internee representatives and
camp administration at Poston.

December 6

At Manzanar, arrest of prisoners accused of informerbeating led to protest and violence. Military police fired into
the crowd, killing two protesters and wounding at least 10
more.

December 24

Public Proclamation No. 15 ends curfew and travel
restriction for German aliens.

1943
January 5

Hirabayashi's conviction for curfew violation reaffirmed by
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.

January 28

Restrictions on Nisei military service are removed.

February 3

WRA began processing the loyalty questionnaire.

February 20

Seven months after it was filed, Mitsuye Endo's case was
forwarded to the Supreme Court by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals.

June 9

California Governor Earl Warren signed bill prohibiting
commercial fishing licenses for alien Japanese.

June 21

Hirabayashi's and Yasui's convictions reaffirmed by the
Supreme Court, but it refused to address the question of
constitutionality raised in the Hirabayashi case.

July 31

WRA designated Tule Lake as a "segregation camp."

October 15

A strike in Tule Lake followed the death of an inmate in a
truck accident.

November 1

Mass demonstrations held in Tule Lake after it was placed
under Army control.

1944
January 14

Tule Lake no longer under Army control.

C- 9

(1944 Continued)
January 20

Secretary of War Stimson announced that Japanese
Americans were eligible for the draft.

July 18

In Cheyenne, Wyoming, a federal district court convicted 63
men from Heart Mountain of draft resistance and sentenced
them to three years in federal penitentiary.

July 29

Federal Judge Louis E. Goodman dismissed indictments
against 26 Tule Lake draft resisters, declaring "It is
shocking... that an American citizen be confined on the
ground of disloyalty, and then... be compelled to serve in the
armed forces, or be prosecuted for not."

December 17

Public Proclamation No. 21 issued by Major General Henry
C. Pratt (effective January 2, 1945), allowing evacuees to
return home and lifting contraband regulations.

December 18

Two years and five months after it was filed, the Endo case
was ruled on in the Supreme Court -- the WRA cannot
detain "loyal" citizens.
Executive Order 9066 and the evacuation was upheld by the
Supreme Court in the Korematsu case. Justice Frank
Murphy disagreed:
I dissent, therefore, from this legalization of racism.
Racial discrimination in any form and in any degree
has no justifiable part whatever in our democratic way
of life. It is unattractive in any setting but it is utterly
revolting among a free people who have embraced
the principles set forth in the Constitution of the
United States."

1945
June 23

Dillon Myer orders closing of Gila River and Poston by
October.

August 14

Japan surrenders. World War II ends.

August 25

Manzanar ordered closed by December 1.
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September 4

Western Defense Command revokes all military restrictions
against Japanese.
1946

March 20

Tule Lake Relocation Center Closed.

June 30

War Relocation Authority closed.
1948

January 19

In Oyama v. California, the Supreme Court struck down the
Alien Land Laws as violations of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

July 2

The Evacuation Claims Act authorized payment to Japanese
Americans who suffered economic loss during
imprisonment: with the necessary proof, 10 cents was
returned for every $1.00 lost.
1988

August 10

President Ronald Regan signs the Civil Liberties Act of
1988, apologizing for the evacuation and awarding each
former evacuee 20,000 dollars compensation.
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APPENDIX D
Relocation of Japanese-Americans. War Relocation Authority Publication dated May 1943. Council of
Churches. Seattle. Box 15. Manuscripts and University Archives, UW Libraries.

RELOCATION OF JAPANESE-AMERICANS
[Click here to see an image of the actual cover of this pamphlet.

Background
During the spring and summer of 1942, the United States Government carried out. in remarkably short
time and without serious incident, one of the largest controlled migrations in history. This was the
movement of 110,000 people of Japanese descent from their homes in an area bordering the Pacific coast
into 10 wartime communities constructed in remote areas between the Sierra Nevada Mountains and the
Mississippi River.
The evacuation of these people was started in the early spring of 1942. At
that time, with invasion of the west coast looming as an imminent
possibility, the Western Defense Command of the United States Army
decided that the military situation required the removal of all persons of
Japanese ancestry from a broad coastal strip. In the weeks that followed,
both American-born and alien Japanese residents were moved from a
prescribed zone comprising the entire State of California, the western half
of Oregon and Washington, and the southern third of Arizona.

The Relocation Program
The United States Government, having called upon these people to move from their homes, also
assumed a responsibility for helping them to become reestablished. To carry out this responsibility, the
President on March 18, 1942, created a civilian agency known as the War Relocation Authority.
The job of this agency, briefly, is to assist in the relocation of any persons who may be required by the
Army to move from their homes in the interest of military security. So far, the work of WRA has been
concerned almost exclusively with people of Japanese descent who formerly lived close to the Pacific
rim of the country.
At first, plans were made by the Western Defense Command and the WRA to build accommodations
only for a portion of the 110,000 evacuated people. A considerable percentage of them, it was hoped,
would move out of the restricted area and resettle inland on their own initiative. During March of 1942,
some 8,000 actually did move, but the great majority were held back by limited resources, general
uncertainty, and mounting signs of community hostility in the intermountain region. By the latter part of
March, it had become apparent that such a large-scale exodus could be handled effectively only on a
planned and systematic basis. Accordingly, all further voluntary evacuation was halted by the Western
Defense Command on March 29 and plans were initiated by WRA for establishing relocation centers
with sufficient capacity and facilities to handle the entire evacuated population for as long as might be
necessary.
The relocation centers, however, are NOT and never were intended to be internment camps or places of
confinement. They were established for two primary purposes: (1) To provide communities where
evacuees might live and contribute, through work, to their own support pending their gradual
reabsorption into private employment and normal American life, and (2) to serve as wartime homes for
those evacuees who might be unable or unfit to relocate in ordinary American communities. Under
regulations adopted in September of 1942, the War Relocation Authority is now working toward a
D-1
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steady depopulation of the centers by encouraging all able-bodied residents with good records of
behavior to reenter private employment in agriculture or industry.
The procedures are relatively simple. At a number of key cities throughout the interior of the country,
the WRA has field employees known as relocation officers and relocation supervisors. These men,
working in close collaboration with local volunteer committees of interested citizens and with the United
States Employment Service, seek out employment opportunities for evacuees in their respective areas
and channel such information to the relocation centers where an effort is made to match up the jobs with
the most likely evacuee candidates. Direct negotiations are then started between the employer and the
potential employee and final arrangements are made ordinarily by mail.
Before any evacuee is permitted to leave a relocation center for the purpose of taking a job or
establishing normal residence, however, certain requirements must be met:
1. A careful check is made of the evacuee's behavior record at the relocation center and of other
information in the hands of WRA. In all questionable cases, any information in the possession of
the federal investigative agencies is requested and studied. If there is any evidence from any
source that the evacuee might endanger the security of the Nation, permission for indefinite leave
is denied.
2. There must be reasonable assurance from responsible officials or citizens regarding local
sentiment in the community where the evacuee plans to settle. If community sentiment appears so
hostile to all persons of Japanese descent that the presence of the evacuee seems likely to cause
trouble, the evacuee is so advised and is discouraged from relocating in that particular area.
3. Indefinite leave is granted only to evacuees who have a definite place to go and some means of
support.
4. Each evacuee going out on indefinite leave must agree to keep WRA informed of any change of
job or change of address.
The primary purpose of this program is to restore as many of the evacuees as possible to productive life
in normal American communities. The specific procedures being followed have been approved by the
Department of Justice as sound from the standpoint of national security and have been endorsed by the
War Manpower Commission as a contribution to national manpower needs. As the program moves
forward, the costs for maintenance of the relocation centers will be steadily reduced.
Persons interested in employing evacuees from relocation centers for any sort of work should
communicate with the nearest relocation supervisor of the WRA. The addresses and names of these
supervisors are:
City
Chicago, 111.
Cleveland, Ohio
Denver, Colo.
Salt Lake City, Utah
Kansas City, Mo.
Little Rock, Ark.
New York, N.Y.

Street address
226 West Jackson Blvd.
Union Commerce Bldg.
Midland Savings Bldg.
318 Atlas Bldg.
1509 Fidelity Bldg.
Pyramid Bldg.
Room 1410, 50 Broadway

Relocation Supervisor
Elmer L. Shirrell
Harold Fistere
Harold Choate
El. Rex Lee
Vernon Kennedy
E. B. Whitaker
Robert M. Cullum

The Evacuated People
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In the interest of both accuracy and fairness, it is important to distinguish sharply
between the residents of relocation centers and the militarists of Imperial Japan.
Two-thirds of the people in the centers are American citizens, born in this country
and educated, for the most part, in American public schools. At all centers, the
residents have bought thousands of dollars worth of war bonds and have made
significant contributions to the American Red Cross. Many of them have sons,
husbands, and brothers in the United States Army. Even the aliens among them have
nearly all lived in the United States for two decades or longer. And it is important to
remember that these particular aliens have been denied the privilege of gaining
American citizenship under our laws.
lit is also important to distinguish between the residents of relocation centers and
civilian internees. Under our laws, aliens of enemy nationality who are found guilty of acts or intentions
against the security of the Nation are being confined in internment camps which are administered not by
the War Relocation Authority but by the Department of Justice. American citizens suspected of
subversive activities are being handled through the ordinary courts. The residents of the relocation
centers, however, have never been found guilty—either individually or collectively—of any such acts or
intentions. They are merely a group of American residents who happen to have Japanese ancestors and
who happened to be living in a potential combat zone shortly after the outbreak of war. All evidence
available to the War Relocation Authority indicates that the great majority of them are completely loyal
to the United States.

The Relocation Centers
The physical standards of life in the relocation centers have never been
much above the bare subsistence level. For some few of the evacuees, these
standards perhaps represent a slight improvement over those enjoyed before
evacuation. But for the great majority of the evacuated people, the
environment of the centers—despite all efforts to make them
livable—remains subnormal and probably always will. In spite of the leave
privileges, the movement of evacuees while they reside at the centers is
necessarily somewhat restricted and a certain feeling of isolation and
confinement is almost inevitable.
Housing is provided for the evacuee residents of the centers in
tarpaper-covered barracks of simple frame construction without plumbing
or cooking facilities of any kind. Most of these barracks are partitioned off
so that a family of five or six, for example, will normally occupy a single
room 25 by 20 feet. Bachelors and other unattached evacuees live mainly in
unpartitioned barracks which have been established as dormitories. The
only furnishings provided by the Government in the residence barracks are
standard Army cots and blankets and small heating stoves. One bath,
laundry, and toilet building is available for each block of barracks and is
shared by upwards of 250 people.
Food is furnished by the Government for all evacuee residents. The meals
are planned at an average cost of not more than 45 cents per person per day
(the actual cost, as this is written, has averaged about 40 cents), are prepared
by evacuee cooks, and are served generally cafeteria style in mess halls that
accommodate between 250 and 300 persons. At all centers,
Government-owned or Government-leased farmlands are being operated by
evacuee agricultural crews to produce a considerable share of the vegetables
needed in the mess halls. At nearly all centers, the farm program also
includes production of poultry, eggs, and pork; and at a few, the evacuees
are raising beef and dairy products. Every evacuee is subject to the same food rationing restrictions as all
other residents of the United States.
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Medical care is available to all evacuee residents of relocation centers without charge. Hospitals have
been built at all the centers and are manned in large part by doctors, nurses, nurses' aides, and
technicians from the evacuee population. Simple dental and optical services are also provided and
special care is given to infants and nursing mothers. Evacuees requesting special medical services not
available at the centers are required to pay for the cost of such services. At all centers, in view of the
crowded and abnormal living conditions, special sanitary precautions are necessary to safeguard the
community health and prevent the outbreak of epidemics.
Work opportunities of many kinds are made available to able-bodied evacuee residents at the relocation
centers. The policy of WRA is to make the fullest possible use of evacuee skills and manpower in all
jobs that are essential to community operations. Evacuees are employed in
the mess halls, on the farms, in the hospitals, on the internal police force, in
construction and road maintenance work, in clerical and stenographic jobs,
and in many other lines of activity. Most of those who work are paid at the
rate of $ 16 a month for a 44-hour week. Apprentices and others requiring
close supervision receive $12 while those with professional skills,
supervisory responsibilities, or unusually difficult duties are paid $19. In
addition, each evacuee working at a relocation center receives a small
monthly allowance for the purchase of work clothing for himself and
personal clothing for his dependents. Opportunities for economic gain in the ordinary sense are almost
completely lacking to the residents of the centers.
Education through the high-school level is provided by WRA for all school-age
residents of the relocation centers. High schools are being built at most of the
centers, but grade-school classes will continue to be held in barrack buildings
which have been converted for classroom use. Courses of study have been
planned and teachers have been selected in close collaboration with State
departments of education and in conformity with prevailing State standards.
Roughly one-half of the teachers in the schools have been recruited from the
evacuee population. Japanese language schools of the type common on the west coast prior to
evacuation are expressly forbidden at all relocation centers.
Vocational training is provided at relocation centers as a part of the regular school program for
youngsters and in connection with the employment program for adults. The purpose of this training is
twofold: (1) To equip the evacuee residents so that they will be able to play a more productive role in
agriculture or industry outside the centers and (2) to provide potential replacements at the centers for
those who go out on indefinite leave.
Internal security at each relocation center is maintained by a special police force composed largely of
able-bodied evacuee residents and headed by a nonevacuee chief plus a few nonevacuee assistants.
Misdemeanors and other similar offenses are ordinarily handled within the center either by the Project
Director or by a judicial commission made up of evacuee residents. The maximum penalty for such
offenses is imprisonment or suspension of work and compensation privileges for a period of 3 months.
Major criminal cases are turned over to the outside courts having appropriate jurisdiction. At each
center, the exterior boundaries are guarded by a company of military police who may be called into the
center in cases of emergency. The Federal Bureau of Investigation is also called in from time to time as
the need arises.
Consumer enterprises, such as stores, canteens, barber shops, and shoe-repair establishments, are
maintained at the relocation centers in order that the residents may purchase goods and services which
are not provided as part of the regular subsistence. These enterprises are all self-supporting and are
managed by the evacuee residents mainly on a consumer cooperative basis. Each resident is eligible for
membership in the relocation center cooperative association and all members are entitled to patronage
dividends which are derived from the profits and based on the individual volume of purchases. As
rapidly as possible, the cooperative associations are being incorporated under appropriate laws.
Evacuee government is practiced in one form or another at every relocation center. In some of the
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centers, formal charters have been drawn up and evacuee governments roughly paralleling those found
in ordinary cities of similar size have been established. In others, evacuee participation in community
government has been along more informal lines and has consisted largely of conferences held by small
groups of key residents with the Project Director whenever important decisions affecting the population
must be reached. The evacuee governmental set-up is not in any sense a substitute for the administration
provided by the WRA Project Director and his staff, but residents are encouraged to assume
responsibility for many phases of community management.
Religion is practiced at relocation centers with the same freedom that
prevails throughout the United States. Nearly half of the evacuees are
Christian church members. No church buildings have been provided by the
Government but ordinary barracks are used for services by Protestants,
Catholics, and Buddhists alike. Ministers and priests from the evacuee
population are free to carry on their religious activities at the centers and
may also hold other jobs in connection with the center administration. Such
workers, however, are not paid by WRA for the performance of their
religious duties.
Leisure-time activities at the centers are planned and organized largely by the evacuee residents. The
WRA merely furnishes advice and guidance and makes certain areas and buildings available for
recreational purposes. At each center, recreational activities of one sort or another have been organized
for all groups of residents from the smallest children to the oldest men and women. Local branches of
national organizations such as the Red Cross, the YMCA, the YWCA, and the Boy Scouts are definitely
encouraged. At some of the centers, athletic contests are arranged periodically with teams from nearby
towns.

Student Relocation
Although the War Relocation Authority is placing first emphasis on relocation of evacuees in private
employment, student evacuees are also being permitted to leave the centers for the purpose of beginning
or continuing a higher education. Applicants for student leave must meet the same requirements as all
other applicants for indefinite leave and are permitted to enroll only at institutions where no objection to
the attendance of evacuee students has been raised by either the War or Navy Department. The WRA
provides no financial assistance to evacuees going out on student leave.

Conservation of Evacuee Property
When 110,000 people of Japanese descent were evacuated from the Pacific coast military area during the
spring and summer of 1942, they left behind in their former locations an estimated total of
approximately $200,000,000 worth of real, commercial, and personal property. These properties range
from simple household appliances to extensive commercial and agricultural holdings.
At the time of evacuation, many of the evacuees disposed of their properties, especially their household
goods, in quick sales that frequently involved heavy financial losses. The majority, however, placed their
household furnishings in storage and retained their interest in other holdings even after they were
personally transferred to relocation centers. Since these people are now in the position of absentee
owners and since many of their properties are highly valuable in the war production effort, the War
Relocation Authority is actively assisting them to keep their commercial and agricultural properties in
productive use through lease or sale and is helping them in connection with a wide variety of other
property problems.
To carry out this work, the Authority maintains an Evacuee Property Office in San Francisco with
branches in Los Angeles and Seattle and employs an Evacuee Property Officer on the staff at each
relocation center. Two principal types of service are rendered. In connection with personal properties,
such as household furnishings, the Authority provides—at the option of the evacuee owners—either
storage in a Government warehouse located within the evacuated area or transportation at Government
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expense to a point of residence outside. In connection with real estate, commercial holdings, farm
machinery, and other similar properties, the Authority acts more in the role of intermediary or agent. At
the request of evacuee property-holders, it attempts to find potential buyers or tenants, arranges for the
rental or sale of both commercial and agricultural holdings, checks inventories of stored personal goods,
audits accounts rendered to evacuees, and performs a variety of similar services. Any person who is
interested in buying or leasing the property of evacuees should communicate with the nearest Evacuee
Property Office in the West Coast evacuated area. The locations of these offices are:
Whitcomb Hotel Building, San Francisco, Calif.
Room 955, 1031 South Broadway, Los Angeles, Calif.
Room 6609, White Building, Seattle, Wash.
Wherever possible, these offices will try to put potential buyers or tenants in touch with potential sellers
or lessors among the evacuee population. It should be emphasized, however, that the WRA has no
authority to requisition the property of evacuees and cannot force any resident of a relocation center to
sell or lease against his will. Final agreement on terms is solely a matter between the parties directly
involved.
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Appendix E
Interview With Former Japanese American Evacuees
Purpose is to determine attributes of former evacuees' political and civic orientation.
INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERVIEW
My name is
I am doing a survey in order to find out how people who lived through the
Japanese American evacuation feel about government and about civic affairs. We would like to know how
they differ in their attitudes and in what ways they are similar.
TO BE FILLED OUT BY INTERVIEWER AT BEGINNING OF INTERVIEW
l.Sex
2. Age at time of evacuation
3. Background of interviewee:
Issei, Nisei, or Kibei
4. In which relocation center (s) were you interned?
la. Do you follow the accounts of political and governmental affairs? Would you say you follow them
regularly, from time to time, or never? (IF NEVER OR DON'T KNOW, SKIP TO Q. 3)
ASK 2b, 2c, 2d ONLY IF RESPONDENT FOLLOWS THE ACCOUNTS OF POLITICAL AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS:
Ib. What about newspapers - do you follow accounts of political and governmental affairs in the
newspapers nearly every day, about once a week, from time to time, or never?
Ic. What about on the radio or television? Do you listen to accounts of public affairs nearly every day,
about once a week, from time to time or never?
Id. What about magazines? Do you read about public affairs in magazines about once a week, from time to
time, or never?
2. What about talking about public affairs to other people? Do you do that nearly every day, once a
week, from time to time, or never.
3. Suppose there were some question that you had to take to a government office - for example, a tax
question or housing regulation. Do you think you would be given equal treatment; would you be treated as
well as anyone else?
4. Did you vote in the last presidential election?
5a. Suppose a law were being considered by your local government that you considered very unjust or
harmful. What do you think you could do? (IF NEEDED) Anything else?
5b. If you made an effort to change this law, how likely is it that you would succeed?
6. Have you ever done anything to try to influence a government decision?
7. Now, I would like to ask you a about how decisions were made in your family when you were a child,
let's say when you were sixteen. In general, how were decisions made in your family?
In general, father made the decisions
In general, mother made the decisions
Both parents acted together
8. When your parents made decisions affecting you, how well did you think they understood your needs?
Did they understand them very well, fairly well, not so well, or not at all? (IF RESPONDENT ASKS:
QUESTION REFERS TO RESPONDENT'S VIEW AT THE TIME, NOT LOOKING BACK NOW
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9. As you were growing up, let's say when you were around sixteen, how much influence do you remember
having in family decisions affecting yourself? Did you have much influence, some, or none at all?
10. At around the same time, if a decision were made that you didn't like, did you feel free to complain, did
you feel a little uneasy about complaining, or was it better not to complain?
lOa. If you complained, did it make any difference in your parents' decision? Did it make a lot of
difference, some, or none?
11. Did your teachers in school treat everyone fairly, or were some treated better than others?
12. In general, how are decisions made in your family now?
By and large, husband makes the decision
By and large, wife makes the decision
Both act together
13. Have you ever been a member of any organizations (labor unions, business organizations, social
groups, professional or farm organizations, cooperatives, fraternal or veterans' groups, athletic clubs,
political, charitable, civic, or religious organizations) or any other organized group?
14a. (IF NEEDED) Which ones?
14b. Was this before or after evacuation?
14c. (IF EVER A MEMBER) Were you ever an officer in this (one of these) organization(s)?
15. How did your experiences during the evacuation affect your interest and involvement in civic affairs?
I became more interested and involved
I became less interested and involved
There was no change in my interest and involvement
15. How did your experiences during the evacuation affect your interest and involvement in local, state or
national government?
I became more interested and involved
I became less interested and involved
There was no change in my interest and involvement
16. (If more interested) Which are you most interested in?
Local government
State government
National government
17. Have you ever been active in a political campaign? That is, have you ever worked for a candidate or
party, contributed money, or done any other active work?
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18. Think now of the life you led before evacuation and of the life you led after evacuation. Is there a
difference in how you view government?
IF A DIFFERENCE, ASK 26a, b, c
18a. In what way was there a difference?
18b. What would you say is the cause of this difference?
IF NO DIFFERENCE, ASK 23c, 23d
18c. In what ways is your view of government the same?
18d. Why do you think there is no difference?
19. Did you ever vote in a presidential, state or local election before the evacuation?
(IF NO) Why not? (If yes) Which one(s)
20. Did you have job while at (name of relocation center)? If yes, ask 26b
20a. What kind of job?
20b. Do you feel the kind of work you did made a positive contribution to the (name of relocation center)
community?
21. Were any elections held at (name of relocation center)?
2la. Did you vote?
21 b. Did you run for any elective office? What office? Did you win?
22.1 have heard that sometimes evacuees would protest government policy in the relocation centers.
23a. Did you see any protests at (name of relocation center)?
23b. (If yes) Were you ever involved in any protests?
23c. Did the(se) protest(s) have a positive influence on life at (name of relocation center)?
24. Were there any committees at (name of relocation center) to help organize and run things?
24a. (If yes) Were the members of theses committees elected or appointed?
24b. Did you ever serve on a committee?
24c. Did this (these) committee(s) have a positive influence on life at (name of relocation center)?
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Appendix F
List of Interviews

NOTE: All interviews were conducted under conditions of anonymity.

Anonymous

Nisei
Female. Age at time of evacuation: 28. Interned at Gila River
Relocation Center, Arizona.
Interviewer: Allen Atkinson.

Anonymous

Nisei/Sansei
Male. Age at time of evacuation: 22. Interned at Manzanar
Relocation Center, CA.
Interviewer: Allen Atkinson.

Anonymous

Date: August 20, 1998

Nisei
Female. Age at time of evacuation: 19. Interned at Manzanar
Relocation Center, CA.
Interviewer: Allen Atkinson.

Anonymous

Date: August 19, 1998

Nisei
Male. Age at time of evacuation: 19. Interned at Manzanar
Relocation Center, CA and Topaz Relocation Center, UT.
Interviewer: Allen Atkinson.

Anonymous

Date: August 25, 1998

Kibei
Male. Age at time of evacuation: 21. Interned at Granada
Relocation Center, Colorado.
Interviewer: Allen Atkinson.

Anonymous

Date: July 7, 1998

Date: August 20, 1998

Nisei
Female. Age at time of evacuation: 16. Interned at Manzanar
Relocation Center, CA.
Interviewer: Allen Atkinson.
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Date: August 28, 1998

Anonymous
^

Nisei
Male. Age at time of evacuation: 16. Interned at Manzanar
Relocation Center, CA.
Interviewer: Allen Atkinson.

Anonymous

Date: August 28, 1998

Nisei
Male. Age at time of evacuation: 16. Interned at Manzanar
Relocation Center, CA and Tule Lake Relocation Center and
Segregation Center, CA.
Interviewer: Allen Atkinson. Date: August 28, 1998

Anonymous

Nisei
Female. Age at time of evacuation: 16. Interned at Manzanar
Relocation Center, CA.
Interviewer: Allen Atkinson.

Anonymous

Date: August 28, 1998

Nisei
Female. Age at time of evacuation: 14. Interned at Manzanar
Relocation Center, CA.
Interviewer: Allen Atkinson.

F-2

Date: August 28, 1998

